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Abstract
Recent technological developments allow Internet users to disseminate ideas to a large audi-
ence. These technological advances empower individuals and promote important social objectives. 
However, they also create a setting for speech-related torts, harm, and abuse. One legal path to 
deal with online defamation turns to the liability of online content providers who facilitate the 
harmful exchanges. The possibility of bringing them to remove defamatory content and collect-
ing damages from them attracted a great deal of attention in scholarly work, court decisions, and 
regulations. Different countries established different legal regimes. The United States allows an 
extensive shield—an overall immunity, as it exempts the liability of content providers in speech 
torts. This policy is not adopted worldwide. The E.U. directive outlines a “notice-and-takedown” 
safe haven. Other countries, such as Canada, use common tort law practices. This Article criti-
cizes all of these policy models for being either over or under inclusive. This Article makes the 
case for a context-specific regulatory regime. It identifies specific characteristics of different con-
tent providers with their own unique settings, which call for nuanced legal rules that shall provide 
an optimal liability regime. To that end, the Article sets forth an innovative taxonomy: it relies 
on sociological studies premised on network theory and analysis, which is neutral to technologi-
cal advances. This framework distinguishes between different technological settings based on the 
strength of social ties formed in each context. The Article explains that the strength of such ties 
influences the social context of online interactions and flow of information. The strength of ties 
is the best tool for designing different liability regimes; such ties serve as a proxy for the severity 
of harm that defamatory online speech might cause, and the social norms that might mitigate or 
exacerbate speech-related harm. The proposed taxonomy makes it possible to apply a sociological 
analysis to legal policy and to outline modular rules for content providers’ liability at every junc-
ture. This Article does so while taking into account basic principles of tort law, as well as freedom
∗* Ph.D. University of Haifa-Faculty of Law. This Article is drawn from my dissertation titled,
“Social Context, Law and Technology—Rethinking Intermediaries’ Liability for Speech Torts,”
written under the supervision of Tal Zarsky. I am grateful for his insightful guidance. This project
also benefitted from valuable comments of Jonthan Lewy and from conversations with Jack Balkin,
Gustavo Mesch, and Guy Pessach. I also thank the participants of the Intermediaries’ Liability
Symposium, University of Haifa (May, 2012). Finally, I am much grateful to Katie Rosenberg,
Elizabeth Walker and their colleagues on the Fordham IPLJ for outstanding work that profoundly
improved the quality of this Article.
of speech, reputation, fairness, efficiency, and the importance of promoting innovation.
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nate ideas to a large audience. These technological advances empower 
individuals and promote important social objectives. However, they also 
create a setting for speech-related torts, harm, and abuse. 
One legal path to deal with online defamation turns to the liability 
of online content providers who facilitate the harmful exchanges. The 
possibility of bringing them to remove defamatory content and collecting 
damages from them attracted a great deal of attention in scholarly work, 
court decisions, and regulations. Different countries established different 
legal regimes. The United States allows an extensive shield—an overall 
immunity, as it exempts the liability of content providers in speech torts. 
This policy is not adopted worldwide. The E.U. directive outlines a “no-
tice-and-takedown” safe haven. Other countries, such as Canada, use 
common tort law practices. This Article criticizes all of these policy mod-
els for being either over or under inclusive. 
This Article makes the case for a context-specific regulatory regime. 
It identifies specific characteristics of different content providers with 
their own unique settings, which call for nuanced legal rules that shall 
provide an optimal liability regime. To that end, the Article sets forth an 
innovative taxonomy: it relies on sociological studies premised on net-
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work theory and analysis, which is neutral to technological advances. 
This framework distinguishes between different technological settings 
based on the strength of social ties formed in each context. The Article 
explains that the strength of such ties influences the social context of on-
line interactions and flow of information. The strength of ties is the best 
tool for designing different liability regimes; such ties serve as a proxy for 
the severity of harm that defamatory online speech might cause, and the 
social norms that might mitigate or exacerbate speech-related harm. 
The proposed taxonomy makes it possible to apply a sociological 
analysis to legal policy and to outline modular rules for content provid-
ers’ liability at every juncture. This Article does so while taking into ac-
count basic principles of tort law, as well as freedom of speech, reputa-
tion, fairness, efficiency, and the importance of promoting innovation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A lawyer found out that his name was tainted in various online 
platforms, where it was stated that he is “a crook.” These defama-
tory expressions were published in the comments sections follow-
ing an article on lawyer malpractice. The comments were written 
by unknown Internet users in news portals. They were also echoed 
in reviews in user-review websites, on blogs, discussion forums, 
and social networks. The lawyer claimed that these were false 
statements. Yet, he did not know who published them because of 
the anonymity or pseudonymity of the users. He turned to the rele-
vant content providers, asked them to take down the expressions, 
and filed a libel suit against them. How should the law regulate con-
tent providers’ liability for defamation? Should the law outline a 
standard liability regime for regulating all types of content provid-
ers? Should the law distinguish between them? This Article focuses 
on these questions and aims to provide answers. 
New digital technologies create a wealth of ideas and content, 
which is easily and freely accessible to everyone. Technology re-
duces the costs of interaction and distribution, enabling beneficial 
communication dynamics. It allows end users to spread ideas easily 
and quickly to a large audience. These advances empower individ-
uals and promote important social objectives. Yet, they also reduce 
the cost of antisocial and destructive activities.1 The chances for 
speech-related torts harm and abuse to participants or external us-
ers increase manifolds.2 These technological advances create a new 
variety of legal questions and challenges to government policy. 
                                                                                                                            
1 This Article focuses on the problem of abuse, in which users generate negative-value 
content. On the four main problems of user-generated content, see James Grimmelmann, 
The Virtues of Moderation, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 42, 53 (2015). 
2 On anti-social behavior online, see LORI ANDREWS: I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I 
SAW WHAT YOU DID: SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE DEATH OF PRIVACY 72–73 (2012); 
DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 57, 62–63, 66, 69 (2014) 
[hereinafter CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE]; Danielle Keats Citron, Civil Rights 
in Our Information, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION 31 
(Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nusbaum eds., 2010) [hereinafter Citron, Offensive Internet]; 
Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 62–64 (2009) [hereinafter 
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights]. 
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The law allows two ways to deal with online speech related 
torts: (1) filing an action against the end user (the speaker)3 and (2) 
filing an action against the intermediary (the content provider), 
which facilitated the harmful exchange.4 This Article focuses on 
the second, suggesting a model for regulating content providers’ 
indirect liability for speech torts. 
The liability of intermediaries has been the focus of legislation, 
judicial decisions, and scholarly work. Uniform liability regimes, 
with regard to overall immunity, notice-and-takedown safe haven, 
and negligence, have been outlined. These policy models are often 
considered either over- or under-inclusive. Unlike these models, 
this Article suggests a new and unique innovative regulation model: 
a nuanced regulation rule that depends on various online social 
contexts. 
More than fifty years ago, media scholar Marshall McLuhan 
said that “the medium is the message.”5 The medium might be 
more significant than the message itself.6 This statement is even 
truer in the Internet age.7 Different online settings form different 
contexts, which may influence speech within them. Treating cyber-
space as a monolithic entity is a mistake. Different social ties are 
formed on different types of online platforms. These ties affect us-
ers’ digital conduct as well as their credibility and importance. I 
believe that social context is as important as the content itself. 
Therefore, different online platforms must be categorized accord-
                                                                                                                            
3 Users often mask their identities and publish texts anonymously. In these cases, the 
plaintiff has to unmask the identity of the user in the preliminary stage before filing a suit 
against him. 
4 On the pros and cons of these two options (direct action against the user and indirect 
action against the content provider), see Ronen Perry & Tal Zarsky, Liability for Online 
Anonymous Speech: Comparative and Economic Analyses, 5 J. EUR. TORT L. 2, 7–11 (2014) 
[hereinafter Perry & Zarsky, Liability for Online Anonymous Speech]; Ronen Perry & Tal 
Zarsky, Who Should Be Liable for Online Anonymous Defamation? 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 
DIALOGUE 162 (2015). 
5 See, e.g., MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 
7 (1964). 
6 MARSHALL MCLUHAN & QUENTIN FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE: AN 
INVENTORY OF EFFECTS 8 (1967). 
7 NICHOLAS CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE INTERNET IS DOING TO OUR BRAINS 6 
(2010). 
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ing to the social structures formed within them. Understanding so-
cial networks will allow a more nuanced, context-specific liability 
regime. Keeping this goal in mind, this Article is divided into the 
following parts: 
Part I outlines an overview of the regulatory regimes in differ-
ent traditional intermediaries outside the web. Historically, the 
medium of communication has played a significant role in assessing 
liability;8 different intermediaries are governed by different regula-
tory regimes according to their distinctive characteristics. After-
wards, I examine different liability models for content providers in 
different countries, discussing normative considerations from wide 
perspectives, such as free speech considerations. 
In Part II, I draw the distinctions among various web-based ac-
tivities, which are then divided into three categories based on the 
strength of social ties that users form while conversing in a particu-
lar online platform. Instead of relying on technology-based distinc-
tions, I utilize a sociological approach, which is indifferent to tech-
nological advancements. Instead, it relies on insights from “net-
work theory.” It focuses on parameters that are designed to predict 
the strength of social ties, which are formed online and offline. As 
such, it explains social dynamics and provides invaluable insights. 
Basing a liability regime on social ties is natural. Speech torts are 
affected by the flow of information within social contexts. As a re-
sult, it stands to reason that policy should take this context into ac-
count and relate to it. Following sociological studies, I identify 
three distinctive categories of digital conversations: (1) “free 
style”; (2) “peer production”; (3) “deliberation and structuring 
communities.” 
Part III focuses on the intersection between network theory and 
the liability of content providers, applying the sociological insights 
to the law. I offer a differential model for regulating the liability of 
intermediaries. This model suggests different liability regimes for 
different content providers based on the abovementioned catego-
ries, while balancing competing interests and policy considerations. 
                                                                                                                            
8 Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications Decency Act and the Online 
Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 137, 141 (2008). 
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I also address objections and challenges arising from the proposed 
model. Applying the model would promote accuracy, certainty, and 
the proper balance among human rights, fairness, and efficiency. 
I. INTERMEDIARIES’ LIABILITY AND SPEECH TORTS: THE LAW, A 
NORMATIVE ANALYSIS, AND A CALL FOR CHANGE 
Different traditional offline intermediaries are ruled by differ-
ent regulatory regimes according to their distinctive characteristics. 
This Part overviews, in a nutshell, the regulatory regimes govern-
ing different media outlets. I examine the similarities between these 
outlets and online content providers. After this comparison, I deal 
with the desirable liability regime for regulating content providers. 
I describe existing models in different countries and discuss a wide 
range of normative considerations for liability. Finally, I propose a 
critical analysis of the standard liability models and suggest a new 
path instead: a particular differential regulatory regime. 
A. Traditional Intermediaries and Liability Regimes 
The debate on intermediaries’ liability in speech torts is not 
new. The law differentiates between the traditional intermediaries 
and regulates them with particular regimes. 
The printing press is subjected to legal rules and ethical norms 
regulating its activities. For example, newspapers are liable wheth-
er they authored the defamatory text or not.9 Journalists have as-
serted themselves to act in the public interest. The Code of Ethics 
of the Society of Professional Journalists, for example, provides 
that journalists “should be free of obligation to any interest other 
than the public’s right to know,” and they should avoid “conflicts 
of interest, real or perceived” and “refuse gifts, favors, fees, free 
travel, and special treatment.”10 
The obligations of newspapers likely stem from their perceived 
role as a watchdog, thus owing a fiduciary duty of sorts to the pub-
                                                                                                                            
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 578 cmt. b, 581(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see 
also Ciolli, supra note 8, at 144. 
10 See Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 
123 (2006). 
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lic. Press organizations use their social and economic capital to 
check the government, and they function as political institutions on 
their own, vying for power from a position of power.11 Thus, the 
press is often dubbed the “fourth estate.”12 Traditionally, newspa-
per editors had a significant amount of editorial control and discre-
tion over content. They frequently devoted a significant amount of 
time and expense in vetting stories for publication. This often con-
veyed a sense of authority among readers. Consistent with this per-
ception, courts treat newspapers as if they have adopted the state-
ments they published as their own. Consequently, they are subject 
to speech torts liability.13 
Media programming is even more central to the public dis-
course than newspapers. As a result, it is subjected to more com-
prehensive restrictions and limitations. The Federal Communica-
tions Commission (“FCC”) is the regulating authority of tele-
communication media; among other duties, it has the authority to 
issue broadcast licenses.14 Public interest obligations ensure that 
informative and educational programming remains on our screens, 
accessible to the general populace and ensure diversity. 
Regulation was required because of spectrum scarcity. The 
government’s goal was to balance freedom of speech and an array 
of political views with a limited number of channels. The particular 
means chosen to attain this end was the fairness doctrine.15 This 
                                                                                                                            
11 See TIMOTHY E. COOK, GOVERNING WITH THE NEWS: THE NEWS MEDIA AS A 
POLITICAL INSTITUTION, 12 (1998). 
12 See Goodman supra note 10, at 122 n.231. The term “fourth estate” was coined by 
Thomas Carlyle in 1841 to refer to reporters in the British House of Commons who 
exhibited autonomy from the government and assumed a duty to speak the truth. Id. 
13 Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253, 258 
(2006); see Ciolli, supra note 8, at 144–45. 
14 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–615b (2006). Section 309 of the Act 
requires the Commission to consider, in determining the eligible parties to whom licenses 
may be granted, whether “the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served” 
by such grants. Id. § 309; see also Note, Tilling the Vast Wasteland: The Case for Reviving 
Localism in Public Interest Obligations for Cable Television, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1034, 1037–
38, 1049 (2013). 
15 This doctrine aimed at advancing the public interest by imposing a standard duty 
comprised of two essential elements: (1) “the making of reasonable provision for the 
discussion of controversial issues of public importance in the community served” and (2) 
the presentation of “different attitudes and viewpoints concerning these vital and often 
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doctrine came under constitutional attacks and was eventually 
abandoned.16 
The legal authority granting the FCC regulatory powers over 
cables differs. Unlike broadcasters, whose licenses are awarded 
pursuant to regulatory procedures defined and managed by 
the FCC, cable companies must petition municipal boards. The 
passage of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Compe-
tition Act of 1992,17 which compels cable companies to apportion 
up to one-third of their channel capacity for the transmission of 
local broadcast, marked a significant move by the FCC in the direc-
tion of structural, local regulation. For example, in Turner Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. FCC, the Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of these so-called “must-carry” provisions.18 After re-
manding this case upon first review for further evidentiary devel-
opment, the Court ultimately concluded that a “must-carry [provi-
sion] serves the Government’s interests in a direct and effective 
way” by “ensuring that a number of local broadcasters retain cable 
carriage, with the concomitant audience access and advertising 
revenues needed to support a multiplicity of stations.” Communi-
cation diversity is the core value guiding communication policy and 
therefore wins in this case.19 
The FCC also regulates the responsibility of broadcasters re-
garding the identification of sponsors,20 and prompts disclosure 
                                                                                                                            
controversial issues.” See Note, supra note 14, at 1038; see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375, 390 (1969). 
16 Over time, the FCC’s steadfast adherence to the fairness doctrine waned, as 
journalists and other members of the public complained of the chilling effects that 
attended compulsory ideological equity. The doctrine was formally abandoned in 1985. 
See In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Communication Rules and Regulations 
Concerning the Gen. Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broad. Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 
142, 147 (1985); ANGIE A. WELBORN & HENRY COHEN, CONG. RES. SERV., REGULATION 
OF BROADCAST INDECENCY: BACKGROUND AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 22 (2005). 
17 See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); 
Note, supra note 14, at 1040–52. 
18 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
19 See id.; Turner Broad. Sys., v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Bill D. Herman, Opening 
Bottlenecks: On Behalf of Mandated Network Neutrality, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 103, 116 
(2006). 
20 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 317(a), 508 (2006). 
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obligations.21 Editorial responsibility exists also in this media form, 
and as a result, TV and radio editors are liable for slander just as 
newspaper editors are liable for publishing defamatory content. 
Broadcasters are subject to strict liability. Even “live broad-
cast” is not an hermetic defense in court, because of the availability 
of delaying technologies, which allow editors an overview of live 
feeds, and the ability to block harmful speech.22 Liability for “live 
broadcast” must balance the value of watching programs and news 
in real time,23 and the need to avoid harmful speech.24 As for cable 
TV, different laws and liability regimes apply.25 
The rationale behind holding media liable for defamatory con-
tent is derived from several normative arguments. First, the print-
ing press and programming media possess a significant amount of 
editorial control over the content they disseminate. Second, the 
spectrum of broadcasting is limited. Thus, it has been argued that 
the media holds a public responsibility for using a limited resource. 
                                                                                                                            
21 Broadcasters must disclose the identity of sponsorships and sponsors to consumers. 
See Goodman, supra note 10, at 109; Zahr Said, Embedded Advertising and the Venture 
Consumer, 89 N.C. L. REV. 99, 102 (2010). 
22 See Ira P. Robbins, Digitus Impudicus: The Middle Finger and the Law, 41 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1403, 1449–50 (2008). In the United States, live broadcast is not an hermetic 
defense. The difficulty to review the program beforehand is just one consideration for 
exemption. See Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005 § 3, Pub. L. No. 109-235, 
120 Stat. 491; WELBORN & COHEN, supra note 16, at 15; Jenifer L. Marino, More “Filthy 
Words” but No “Free Passes” for the “Cost of Doing Business”: New Legislation Is the Best 
Regulation for Broadcast Indecency, 15 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 135, 137, 153 
(2005). 
23 On the importance of immediate real-time broadcast of sport matches, see Mark 
Conrad, Fleeting Expletives and Sports Broadcasts: A Legal Nightmare Needs a Safe Harbor, 
18 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 175–76, 188, 191, 199 (2008). 
24 Other countries have chosen different liability regimes for live broadcast. In Israel, 
for example, broadcasters are held liable for live broadcasts as distributors. See Israeli 
Defamation Act, §§ 12, 15 (1965). Thus, passive conduits that still maintain control over 
the dissemination of information after publication might still face liability if they choose to 
continue to disseminate defamatory content after being aware of it. See id. 
25 Scholars criticized the difference between broadcast and cable TV. See Lindsay 
LaVine, Legislative Update: The Lion, the Witch (Hunt) and the Wardrobe Malfunction: 
Congress’s Crackdown on Television Indecency, 15 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 385, 407–
08 (2005). It has been asserted that most people pick up the remote control and pay little 
attention to whether they are watching pay stations or regular television as they surf 
through channels. Thus, the regulation is only partial. See id. 
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Third, programming media is more accessible for the public and 
tends to influence viewers more than other traditional intermedia-
ries. Consequently, these reasons justified the strict liability go-
verning this type of media. 
Common carriers, such as telephone and telegraph companies, 
differ from the printing press and broadcasters. Common law im-
posed on them a special duty to offer their services to anyone on 
just and reasonable terms without discrimination.26 The status of 
“common carriers” was later recognized in telecommunication 
regulations.27 
The law imposes liability on common carriers that discriminate 
content without cause. It requires that all customers be served.28 
Common carriers traditionally enjoyed immunity for defamatory 
statements over their networks since they have no editorial con-
trol.29 
B. Online Content Providers: Features and Comparison to Traditional 
Intermediaries 
The Internet has brought new challenges for providers’ liabili-
ty. This new medium is fundamentally different from traditional 
intermediaries both in its architecture and in its applications. Con-
tent is almost unlimited; and it is created by active participation of 
users. Readers are not only passive consumers, but authors of con-
                                                                                                                            
26 James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 225, 252, 261 (2002). 
27 For the definition of “common carrier,” see 47 U.S.C. § 153(11) (2012); FCC v. 
Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 699–701 (1979). 
28 See In re Edwards Indus., Inc., 74 F.C.C.2d 322, 328 (1979); Phil Nichols, Redefining 
“Common Carrier”: The FCC’s Attempt at Deregulation by Redefinition, 1987 DUKE L.J. 
501, 503 (1987). It should be noted that the law restricts only entities defined under 
“common carriers” status from discriminating content. See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 
623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014). However, a reform strives to change classification. See Rebecca 
R. Ruiz & Steve Lohr, F.C.C. Approves Net Neutrality Rules, Classifying Broadband Internet 
Service as a Utility, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/27/
technology/net-neutrality-fcc-vote-internet-utility.html [https://perma.cc/PL8F-RR2L]. 
29 See Anderson v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 320 N.E.2d 647, 649 (N.Y. 1974); Ciolli, supra note 
8, at 145. 
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tent as well. Unlike other intermediaries, the Internet is mostly de-
centralized, without traditional editing.30 
At first glance, it would appear as if common carriers are ana-
logous to online content providers. They offer a platform to users: 
providers do not create the content itself, but rather serve as a pas-
sive conduit of transmission. Therefore, one could argue that con-
tent providers should be exempt from liability, as common carriers 
are. However, a closer look reveals that this analogy is imprecise. 
Internet content providers are not mere conduits, but they possess 
the ability to control third-party content,31 as they often do when 
they screen content. Moreover, unlike telephone conversations, 
the content Internet providers carry is usually available to the pub-
lic; it is easily accessible and as a result, may cause severe damage 
to one’s good name. Thus, content providers do not fit in the same 
category as telephone companies. 
The wide public access to the content and the ability of content 
providers to control it is tangent to broadcasters. Like broadcasters, 
content providers reach a wide audience. However, the analogy 
ends there. Broadcasters use a limited public resource (the broad-
cast spectrum). Their liability stems from the influence this me-
dium holds and its credibility. Being a watchdog has its price.32 In 
contrast, content providers do not use limited public resources. 
The Internet is a decentralized medium, and the influence of a sin-
gle content item is limited. Additionally, many providers do not 
employ editors for user-generated content. Users publish most of 
their content in real-time, and the amount of content can be tre-
mendous.33 Therefore, pre-screening content may require signifi-
                                                                                                                            
30 DON TAPSCOTT & ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: HOW MASS 
COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 37 (2008). 
31 See Assaf Hamdani, Who’s Liable For Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 945 
(2002). 
32 KARINE NAHON & JEFF HEMSLEY, GOING VIRAL 56 (2013) (explaining that the public 
still turns to traditional intermediaries because of their ascribed credibility). The public 
also turns to traditional intermediaries because of the medium’s ability to deal with the 
problem of information overload. Id. 
33 See, e.g., Chris Welch, YouTube Users Now Upload 100 Hours of Video Every Minute, 
VERGE (May 19, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/5/19/4345514/youtube-users-
upload-100-hours-video-every-minute [https://perma.cc/862L-YMA4]. 
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cant financial resources and time commitment. It is difficult to ex-
pect providers to invest the time and effort to that end.34 
Live broadcasters and online-content providers are comparable 
in some ways: similar to live broadcasting, user-generated content 
is uploaded and accessed in real time without editing. However, 
this analogy is not complete. In contrast to a live broadcast, user-
generated content remains on the platform and can be located by 
search engines.35 Whereas a live broadcast can be recorded for later 
viewing,36 the end-user controls the recording, not the broadcaster. 
On the Internet, content providers retain control over their con-
tent. 
To sum up: online-content providers do not fit traditional cate-
gories of intermediaries. Analysis of liability regimes applying to 
traditional media outlets reveals that different liability regimes re-
gulate different mediums in light of different characteristics. 
Matching the liability regime to the medium’s features is an appro-
priated conceptual model that should be adopted. 
C. Content Providers’ Liability: Comparative Perspective 
1. The United States 
In the United States, lawsuits against online-content providers 
are usually blocked.37 Section 230(c) (1) of the Communications 
Decency Act (“CDA”) directs that “[n]o provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information con-
tent provider.”38 Under this subsection, Congress declared that 
online service providers could not be treated as publishers for ma-
terial they do not develop.39 Congress thus sought to promote self-
                                                                                                                            
34 See JACQUELINE LIPTON, RETHINKING CYBERLAW: A NEW VISION FOR INTERNET 
LAW 120 (2015); Ciolli, supra note 8, at 145. 
35 There are exceptions; for example, updates via RSS or mailing lists are similar to live 
broadcasts because it is difficult to turn the wheel back after the messages were sent. 
36 New technologies, such as TiVo converters for example, enable continuous 
recording of broadcasts. 
37 See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
38 Id. § 230(c)(1). 
39 See id. 
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regulation and free speech.40 While doing so, it allowed vibrant In-
ternet enterprises to prosper.41 Congress explicitly departed from 
common law defamation jurisprudence, which determined an ac-
tor’s liability for third-party content, based on the level of control 
the actor exercised over it.42 The fact that a party exerted or could 
exert control over third-party content led to the application of stric-
ter liability standards.43 
By passing § 230 of the CDA, Congress sought to overrule 
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,44 in which an uniden-
tified user defamed an investment firm on Prodigy’s “Money 
Talk” bulletin board.45 The New York court decided that Prodigy 
acted as a publisher when it screened some areas of its site to make 
it family-friendly.46 Under common law defamation principles, the 
court held that Prodigy, as a publisher, was liable for third-party 
messages on its board, despite the lack of contribution to, notice of, 
or knowledge of the postings’ improper nature.47 Prodigy’s good-
faith efforts to monitor its site resulted in increased liability.48 Leg-
islators recognized the injustice of Stratton Oakmont and exempted 
content providers from traditional publishers’ liability.49 
Courts have interpreted § 230 broadly. Under § 230(c)(1), on-
line service providers, including website operators, have enjoyed 
immunity from primary and secondary liability for a wide variety of 
claims. For example, in Zeran v. America Online, defamatory re-
marks against Zeran were posted on an AOL message board.50 An 
                                                                                                                            
40 See id. 
41 Id. § 230(b)(1)–(2), (c)(1); Anupan Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 
EMORY L.J. 639, 652 (2014); Cecilia Ziniti, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service 
Providers: How Zeran v. America Online Got It Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 583, 585 (2008). 
42 See Ziniti, supra note 41, at 584. 
43 Id. 
44 See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *1 
(Sup. Ct. May 25, 1995). 
45 Id. at *3. 
46 Id. at *18. 
47 See id. 
48 Id. at *2, *5, *7. 
49 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). 
50 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328–29, 332 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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anonymous user advertised that Zeran was selling shirts glorifying 
the Oklahoma City bombing.51 The Fourth Circuit decided that 
distributors were a subset of publishers and were thus immune 
from liability, according to § 230.52 Under this reading, providers 
maintain they have immunity, afforded by § 230, even if they re-
frained from taking an action after learning about potential illegal 
content on their site.53 
After Zeran, § 230 repeatedly shielded web enterprises from 
lawsuits in a plethora of cases.54 Courts have found that content 
providers that host harmful content are immune to liability,55 even 
if they failed to screen harmful content,56 and even after being noti-
fied of the harmful content.57 In Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, the 
Ninth Circuit relied on § 230 to deny Carafano’s lawsuit against 
the owner of the dating website “Matchmaker” for speech 
torts, despite the serious and utterly deplorable consequences that 
occurred.58 Many times, courts have found content providers im-
                                                                                                                            
51 Id. at 329. 
52 Distributers fell under a category of defendants who faced liability upon knowledge 
of offending content they distributed. The court held that § 230 precluded not just strict 
liability as a publisher; it also precluded the application to website operators from 
intermediate liability for distributors. Id. at 330. 
53 As the Fourth Circuit noted in Zeran, a notice-and-takedown rule would lead 
companies to remove controversial statements, rather than face liability. Id. at 333. 
54 See Chander, supra note 41, at 653. 
55 See Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 2015); 
GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 756 (Tex. App. 2014). 
56 See Hupp v. Freedom Commc’ns, Inc., 221 Cal. App. 4th 398 (2013) (applying 
immunity to defamatory comments in an online edition of a newspaper, although the 
content provider supervised the comments). Section 230 has protected Yelp, a consumer 
reviews peer production site, from liability for user reviews. See Obado v. Magedson, No. 
13-2382, 2014 WL 3778261, at *5 (D.N.J. July 31, 2014) (“[Section] 230 immunity 
extends to the service provider’s decisions about how to treat potentially objectionable 
material.”); see also Westlake Legal Grp. v. Schumacher, No. 1:14-cv-564, 2014 WL 
4097643 (E.D. Va. Aug. 19, 2014). 
57 See Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254 n.4 (4th 
Cir. 2009); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1017 (Fla. 2001). Content providers 
that delayed removing harmful content after learning about it were found immune. See 
Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Caraccioli v. Facebook, 
Inc., No. 5:15-cv-04145, 2016 WL 859863 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2016). 
58 See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com 339 F.3d 1119, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003). This case 
involves not only defamation, but also impersonation. See Tal Z. Zarsky & Norberto 
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mune even when they were negligent.59 Content providers were 
also immune to liability when they knowingly declined requests of 
the original publisher to remove the harmful content.60 
Some judges criticized the immunity and tried to narrow it 
down.61 They also tried to sidestep the immunity by employing var-
ious strategies.62 However, the immunity remains broad. 
2. Europe 
The framework for content providers’ liability in Europe is dic-
tated by article 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC (“E-Commerce Direc-
tive”), which provides that intermediaries engaged in “hosting” 
are not liable, unless they have actual knowledge of illegal state-
                                                                                                                            
Nuno Gomes de Andrade, Regulating Electronic Identity Intermediaries: The “Soft eID” 
Conundrum, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1335, 1369 (2013). 
59 See, e.g., Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co., Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 988 
(10th Cir. 2000). Courts have also found content providers immune even if they paid 
third parties to write columns on their platforms, which contained defamatory speech, 
and even when they bought information from third parties and this information was 
erroneous. See id.; Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51, 53 (D.D.C. 1998). 
60 See Giordano v. Romeo, 76 So. 3d 1100, 1103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Glob. 
Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 932 (D. Ariz. 2008). 
61 See the criticism of Judge Easterbrook in Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th 
Cir. 2003). According to Judge Easterbrook, the Zeran decision is flawed because its 
interpretation frustrates the CDA’s stated purpose of encouraging self-regulation by 
granting blanket immunity to Internet service providers regardless of their efforts. See id. 
Judge Easterbrook provided an alternative interpretation for § 230, treating it as a 
definition clause rather than immunity to liability. See id. 
62 See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2009). The Barnes 
court refused to hold Yahoo! liable for false accounts featuring Cecilia Barnes’ name and 
nude pictures created by her ex-boyfriend, pursuant to § 230. Id. at 1105. However, the 
court held Yahoo! liable for promissory estoppel, a subset theory of recovery based on a 
breach of contract. Id. at 1109. In another famous case, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
design of drop-down menus and other features contributed materially to an illegal action 
and was essentially causing third parties to commit speech torts. Fair Housing Council v. 
Roommates.com, LLC., 489 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th 
Cir. 2008). Lately, the Ninth Circuit outlined a “failure to warn” exception to § 230 
immunity. See Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., 767 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’g 
granted, opinion withdrawn, 778 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2015); see also David S. Ardia, Free 
Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 459 (2010); Varty 
Defterderian, Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com: A New Path for Section 230 
Immunity, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 563, 547 (2009). 
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ments or refuse to remove them upon obtaining that knowledge.63 
In other words, content providers (hosts) are subjected to a notice-
and-takedown rule, namely an obligation to remove problematic 
content once a potential plaintiff brings its existence to their atten-
tion. According to article 15(1), member states should not impose a 
general obligation on hosts to monitor the content they transmit 
and store.64 These provisions impose a liability should the court 
find that a content provider, regarded as a “host,” failed to 
promptly comply with takedown requests or had actual knowledge 
of the wrongdoing.65 Moreover, the Directive Recitals (article 47 
and 48), indicate that Member States can impose specific—as op-
posed to general—monitoring obligations and, even more impor-
tantly, subject hosts to duties of care, “which can reasonably be 
expected from them and which are specified by national law, in or-
der to detect and prevent certain types of illegal activities.”66 Last-
ly, the Directive is somewhat dated and its classification might no 
longer be comprehensive. Many content providers may not be 
“hosts” at all.67 In such cases, the Directive’s restrictions would 
not apply. 
Outside the scope of the E-Commerce Directive, the potential 
liability of content providers is extensive. Thus, for example, the 
Estonian Supreme Court found the popular Delfi news website lia-
ble for defamatory statements about a famous Estonian business 
                                                                                                                            
63 Directive 2000/31/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic 
Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 [hereinafter E-Commerce 
Directive]. The directive was absorbed into particular legislation of the member states. 
See Broder Kleinschmidt, An International Comparison of ISP’s Liabilities for Unlawful 
Third Party Content, 18 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 332, 345–48 (2010); Joris van Hoboken, 
Legal Space For Innovative Ordering: On the Need to Update Selection Intermediary Liability 
in the EU, 13 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (2009). 
64 See Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-12006; see also 
Perry & Zarsky, Liability for Online Anonymous Speech, supra note 4. 
65 See E-Commerce Directive, supra note 63, at 6. 
66 Id.; THIBAULT VERBIEST ET AL., STUDY ON THE LIABILITY OF INTERNET 
INTERMEDIARIES 5 n.22 (2007). 
67 See Perry & Zarsky, Liability for Online Anonymous Speech, supra note 4; Peggy 
Valcke & Marieke Lenaerts, Who’s Author, Editor and Publisher in UGC Content? Applying 
Traditional Media Concepts to UGC Providers, 24 INT’L REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 119, 
126 (2010). 
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executive.68 Anonymous users posted the statements on the com-
ment section following an article about his business ventures.69 The 
court here interpreted the Directive narrowly and found Delfi liable 
even though it followed the notice-and-takedown practice and 
complied with the requirements of the E.U. Directive.70 The court 
held that Delfi could not benefit from the safe haven of the direc-
tive because by allowing comments from unregistered users the site 
is liable as a publisher.71 
Delfi filed a complaint against the decision to the European 
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), claiming that its right to 
freedom of expression was violated.72 The First Section of the 
ECtHR disagreed.73 It upheld the Estonian court’s ruling and 
found it a proportional interference with freedom of expression ac-
cording to article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.74 
Delfi appealed to the Grand Chamber.75 In a very long decision, 
the appellate court confirmed the previous chamber decision.76 
The decision generated substantial confusion regarding the distinc-
                                                                                                                            
68 Delphi AS v. Estonia (Delphi I), App. No. 64569/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 See id. The court here applied a narrow interpretation for intermediaries’ technical 
functions. For expansion on this, see Martin Husovec, ECtHR Rules on Liability of ISPs as 
a Restriction of Freedom of Speech, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 108, 109 (2014). 
75 The Helsinky Foundation for Human Rights and Digital Media Association joined to 
the appeal as amicus curiae. See Brief for The Helsinky Foundation for Human Rights as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Delphi I, App. No. 64569/09, Eur. Ct. H.R.; Brief 
for European Digital Media Association, CCIA, and EuroISPA as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Delphi I, App. No. 64569/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. Other 
organizations, such as Access, Article 19, and Media Legal defense, also intervened as 
third parties. See Delphi AS v. Estonia (Delphi II), App. No. 64569/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2015). 
76 See Delphi II, App. No. 64569/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. After assessing the lawfulness of 
intervention with freedom of expression, its legitimacy, and the necessity of interference 
in a democratic society, the Grand Chamber affirmed the outcome and the reasoning of 
the lower court, albeit not unanimously. Id. at paras. 120–39. 
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tions between online ‘publishers’ and mere intermediaries.77 The 
extent of notice-and-takedown provisions also remains unclear.78 
After Delfi, in Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and In-
dex.hu Zrt v. Hungary, the ECtHR reached a different conclusion 
regarding the violation of article 10. Yet, it did not retreat from the 
decision in Delfi. Rather it differentiated the nature of the com-
ments which were published from the comments in Delfi.79 As re-
flected by other tribunal’s decisions the E-Commerce Directive’s 
safe haven is eroding.80 
The difference between the laws in the European Union and 
the United States reflects a divergent understanding of freedom of 
speech. This difference was also reflected in the liability of search 
engines and the interpretation of Directive 95/46/EC (“Data Pro-
tection Directive”).81 The European Court of Justice backed the 
“right to be forgotten”82 in Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de 
                                                                                                                            
77 See Perry & Zarsky, Liability for Online Anonymous Speech, supra note 4, at 16. 
78 See id. 
79 See Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, App. No. 
22947/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. 135 (2016). The court noted that the nature of the comments was 
different, regarded the article as a matter of public interest and the fact that the article did 
not provoke the offensive comments. Id. at para. 72. Thus, the conclusion and result of 
exempting the intermediary from liability may be confined to the individual circumstances 
of this particular case. Id. at para. 64; id. at para. 4 (Kuris, J., concurring). 
80 See Italy Fines TripAdvisor €500,000 over False Reviews, GUARDIAN (Dec. 23, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/travel/2014/dec/23/italy-fines-tripadvisor-500000 
[https://perma.cc/7DB9-EXP6]. The antitrust authority found that insufficient efforts 
were made to stop false reviews after hoteliers and consumer group complained. Id. 
81 Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Data Protection 
Directive]. 
82 This right, now branded as the “right to erasure,” was represented as one of the 
“four pillars” of the new Regulation in the European Union. In October 2013, the 
European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs considered 
and consolidated nearly four thousand proposed amendments to the Commission 
Proposal into a new proposal that was adopted by the Committee. 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data (General Data Protection), COM(2012)0011 – C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD) 
(Oct. 17, 2013). For more expansion, see NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: 
RETHINKING DIGITAL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 91 (2015); Steven C. Bennett, The 
“Right to Be Forgotten”: Reconciling EU and US Perspectives, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161, 
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Protección de Datos.83 The court here ruled that search engines are 
responsible for search results linking to personal data, which ap-
pears on webpages published by third parties.84 
The court reached this conclusion by broadly interpreting the 
term “controller” in from the Data Protection Directive.85 The 
court affirmed that search engines are data processors and control-
lers when they index personal data published on websites.86 How-
ever, the decision referred the Data Protection Directive, not the 
E-Commerce Directive.87 
The relation between the obligations of a search engine provid-
er as a controller and the safe haven principles of the E-Commerce 
Directive is not elaborated and the scope of providers’ liability re-
mains unclear.88 
                                                                                                                            
169 (2012); Ignacio Cofone, Google v. Spain: A Right To Be Forgotten?, 15 CHI.-KENT J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 9–10 (2015); Cooper Mitchell-Rekurt, Search Engine Liability Under 
the Libe Data Regulation Proposal: Interpreting Third Party Responsibilities as Informed by 
Google Spain, 45 GEO. J. INT’L 861 (2014); Abraham L. Newman, What the “Right to be 
Forgotten” Means for Privacy in a Digital Age, SCI. 1 (2015); see generally Jeffrey Rosen, The 
Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88 (2012). 
83 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2014 
E.C.R. 317. 
84 To comply with the judgment, Google offered E.U. citizens the ability to file data 
removal requests. See Anupan Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Free Speech, 100 IOWA L. REV. 501, 
541 (2015). Within twenty-four hours, the search engine received right to be forgotten 
requests from at least twelve thousand individuals. See id. 
85 Data Protection Directive, supra note 81. 
86 See Google Spain SL, 2014 e.C.R. 317, at para. 41 (“Article 2(b) and (d) of Directive 
95/46 are to be interpreted as meaning that, first, the activity of a search engine consisting 
in finding information published or placed on the internet by third parties, indexing it 
automatically, storing it temporarily and, finally, making it available to internet users 
according to a particular order of preference must be classified as ‘processing of personal 
data’ within the meaning of Article 2(b) when that information contains personal data 
and, second, the operator of the search engine must be regarded as the ‘controller’ in 
respect of that processing, within the meaning of Article 2(d).”).  
 For criticism on the interpretation of the European Court of Justice, see Javier 
Aparicio Salom, “A Third Party to Whom Data are Disclosed”: A Third Group Among Those 
Processing Data, INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 1, 11 (2014). 
87 Google Spain SL, 2014 E.C.R. 317. 
88 See Ioannis Iglezakis, The Right to Be Forgotten in the Google Spain Case (Case C-
131/12): A Clear Victory for Data Protection or an Obstacle for the Internet?, 4th INT’L CONF. 
INFO. L. (2014); Miquel Peguera, The Shaky Ground of the Right to be Delisted, 18 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 507 (2016). Characterizing search engines as controllers imply that they 
are not neutral and passive enough to be eligible for the protection of the safe haven. Yet, 
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a) England 
England presents a unique model due to the new Defamation 
Act of 2013.89 Section 5 of the Act states that a victim who can file 
an action against the speaker may not be permitted to sue the con-
tent provider as well.90 The section provides that a website opera-
tor is not liable for a defamatory statement posted on the website if 
it did not post that statement.91 This defense can be defeated, how-
ever, if the victim has insufficient information to identify and bring 
proceedings against the speaker; or if the victim gave notice of 
complaint, and the content provider did not respond to the vic-
tims’ complaint.92 Thus, content providers’ liability is residual and 
generally they will not be liable for the defamatory speech if they 
did not act as publishers.93 
However, in Tamiz v. Google, Inc.,94 which was decided shortly 
before the law was passed, the court took an expansive view of the 
term “publisher.”95 It determined that an operator of a blog service 
might be responsible for a comment on a blog post, even if the 
                                                                                                                            
the “right to be forgotten” is limited in scope, the European Court of Justice confined the 
discussion to searches made by the name of an individual and asserted only a right to 
delist the link—as opposed to a right to remove the information from the search engine’s 
index altogether. See id. 
89 Defamation Act 2013, c. 26 (Eng.). This law came into force on January 1, 2014. See 
MATTHEW COLLINS, COLLINS ON DEFAMATION 1.41–.61, 15.01–.16 (2014). 
90 Defamation Act, § 5. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Section 5 provides that a website operator is generally not liable for a defamatory 
statement posted on the website if it was not the one who posted that statement. The 
[defense] can be defeated, however, if the victim has insufficient information to identify 
and bring proceedings against the speaker, the victim gave notice of complaint, and the 
content provider did not respond to the victim’s complaint in accordance with the 
Defamation (Operators of Websites) Regulations. If the content provider cannot contact 
the speaker, if the speaker does not respond or does not provide the required information 
(including personal name and address), or if he or she agrees to removal, the allegedly 
defamatory content should be removed immediately. Otherwise, the content provider 
need not remove the content, and may provide the speaker’s contact information to the 
victim if the former consents or if a court orders it to do so. Perry & Zarsky, Liability fo 
Online Anonymous Speech, supra note 4, at 19. 
94 Tamiz v. Google, Inc. [2013] EWCA (Civ) 68 [34]–[36] (Eng.). 
95 Id. 
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blogger removed the harmful content.96 The court stated that the 
operator of a blog (Google) might be liable for the defamatory 
comment from the time it received a notice about the harmful con-
tent until it was removed from the service.97 The court reasoned 
that since Google allowed users to design blogs, and it made profits 
from advertisements, it is also liable.98 Yet, in this specific case, the 
court found that given the limited time between notification and 
removal, there had been no substantial damage.99 The court’s 
broad recognition of publisher liability undermined the arrange-
ment in the Defamation Act. Thus, it might be possible to sue con-
tent providers without taking an action against the original speak-
er.100 
3. Canada 
Canada does not have a legal framework as the above-
mentioned E.U. Directive. Therefore, content providers do not 
benefit from any safe haven. Liability is regulated by common law 
and the rules applying to distributors.101 Accordingly, the “inno-
cent dissemination” defense protects those who play a secondary 
role in the chain of distribution. This defense absolves distributors 
from liability, provided they have had no knowledge of the defama-
tory nature of the statement, and that their failure to detect the de-
                                                                                                                            
96 See id. In this case, the victim of a comment on “Blogger” notified Google of a 
defamatory comment about him. Id. ¶ 2. After a few e-mail exchanges between Google 
and the specific blogger, the latter removed the comment voluntarily. Id. However, five 
weeks passed from the exchanges to the removal. Id. ¶ 35. The court stated that, 
regarding this time period, Google might be liable as a publisher. Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 The court did not find the content provider liable because by the time the plaintiff 
sent his notification, the defamatory comments had receded into history by other 
comments. Id. ¶ 50. Therefore, any damage that may have been caused to the appellant’s 
reputation was trivial. See id. 
100 See Perry & Zarsky, Liability fo Online Anonymous Speech, supra note 4, at 6. Broadly 
speaking, where an Internet intermediary knows or ought to be aware of the content of the 
article, and has a realistic ability to control publication of such content, the intermediary is 
considered the publisher of the content. See CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS ¶¶ 22–60 
(21st ed., 2014). 
101 Corey Omer, Intermediary Liability for Harmful Speech: Lessons from Abroad, 28 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 289, 305 (2014). 
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famatory content was not due to negligence.102 The burden of proof 
is on the defendant.103 
Different countries applied different liability regimes for regu-
lating content providers. Even in the same country, the courts can 
apply different standards of liability. A lack of a coherent legal the-
sis explains the different approaches towards the issue. Deciding 
when content providers should be liable for defamatory speech on 
their platforms involves policy considerations, which I will discuss 
in the following Sections. 
D. Normative Considerations 
Liability of content providers lies on the junction of several 
branches of law. It balances constitutional rights and general tort 
considerations. In addition, the technological context involves spe-
cial considerations. 
1. Constitutional Balance and the Base of Speech Torts 
The civil rights concerning content providers liability in speech 
torts are: human dignity, reputation interests, and freedom of 
speech. The standard of liability shapes civil rights online and 
strikes the balance between the right to free expression and human 
dignity. 
The first consideration is the dignity of the persons affected by 
the offensive speech, namely their social standing, their recognition 
as equals, bearers of human rights, and constitutional entitlements. 
Liability for defamation brings to public awareness “the basic ele-
ments of each person’s status, dignity, and reputation as a member 
of society.”104 
                                                                                                                            
102 Id. at 305–06. 
103 See id.; Niemela v. Malamas, 2015 BCSC 1024, at paras. 94–99 (Can.); Crookes v. 
Newton, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 269 (Can.); DAVID A POTTS, CYBERLIBEL: INFORMATION 
WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 279–81 (2011); Andrew Bernstein & Rima Ramchandani, 
Don’t Shoot the Messenger! A Discussion of ISP Liability, 1 CAN. J.L. & TECH., no. 2, 2002, 
at 77, 79. 
104 Peter G. Danchin, Defaming Muhammad: Dignity, Harm, and Incitement to Religious 
Hatred, 2 DUKE F.L. & SOC. CHANGE 5, 17 (2010). 
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The other consideration is the right to free speech. The right to 
free speech protects public communication and shields against 
government censorship.105 But now, many scholars believe that free 
speech is threatened by private entities as well.106 In the United 
States, the freedom of speech is protected more than in other west-
ern democracies.107 Courts and scholars have developed numerous 
theories about why free speech should receive special protection.108 
The first rationale supporting free speech is that it promotes 
individual autonomy and self-fulfillment. It allows the self-
determination of an individual.109 As a result, freedom of speech 
must be assured to anyone. The content is left to the discretion of 
the speaker.110 Censorship expresses disapproval of particular 
speech and the way of life of the speaker.111 The second rationale 
for protecting free speech is the search for truth. The freedom en-
sures that every expression enters the marketplace of ideas.112 The 
third rationale is the understanding that free speech is crucial for 
maintaining a democracy. Freedom of speech is required to assure 
the effectiveness of the democratic process by informing the go-
verned of the acts of government and guaranteeing that policy is 
reached intelligently.113 Contemporary theories of democracy focus 
on protecting and promoting a democratic participatory culture. 
Freedom of speech is required to assure an individual’s ability to 
participate in the production and distribution of culture.114 These 
                                                                                                                            
105 Michael D. Birnhack, More or Better? Shaping the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF 
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 59, 64 (2006). 
106 Id. 
107 RICHARDS, supra note 82, at 10. 
108 See generally Joseph Raz, Free Expression and Personal Identification, 11 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 303 (1991). 
109 Id. at 303, 313–16. 
110 Birnhack, supra note 105, at 66. 
111 Raz, supra note 108, at 312. 
112 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 5–9 (1869); JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A 
SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING (1958). The theory was popularized 
by Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 
(1919). See also RICHARDS, supra note 82, at 35; Birnhack, supra note 105, at 68. 
113 Birnhack, supra note 105, at 71; ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS 
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1965). 
114 Jack Balkin, Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the 
Information Society, N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004); Birnhack, supra note 105, at 71. 
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theories stress both individual liberty and collective self-
governance. 
The digital age places freedom of speech and its underlying jus-
tifications in a new light. It pushes the freedom of expression to the 
forefront, reminding the public of old concerns regarding expres-
sion that has become central and relevant to policy-issue makers.115 
The law often limits the liability of content providers for the 
speech they carry, because by imposing liability on them, they 
might be induced to filter out questionable content. A content pro-
vider loses little from the removal of user-generated content. Yet, 
each comment increases his or her exposure to liability. Thus, he or 
she would rather remove suspected items than face penalties.116 
This “collateral censorship” risk would lead to the suppression of 
lawful, even highly beneficial, speech and could result in a “chilling 
effect.”117 
The Internet, however, can also reduce the cost of destructive 
activities and minimize the cost of anti-social behavior. It allows 
geographically disparate people to combine their efforts into po-
werful force and amplify the severity of harm. Thus, libel on the 
Internet might cause even more severe damage to a person’s repu-
tation and dignity. Exempting content providers from liability 
would deny victims their ability to engage with others as equals, 
which might in some cases even suppress a free public debate. In 
fact, exempting content providers from liability would not only 
harm victims’ autonomy, but also the free market of ideas and pub-
lic participation.118 Thus, the balancing act of this tort must also 
include the victims’ freedom of expression and the constitutional 
rights in question are related to both parties. 
                                                                                                                            
115 Balkin, supra note 114, at 3. 
116 See Hamdani, supra note 31, at 931; Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe 
Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 114 (2007). 
117 See Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
2296, 2309 (2014); Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary 
Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293, 318 (2011). 
118 See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 2, at 191–200. These 
conclusions are reinforced due to the magnitude of information that is being transmitted. 
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2. Theories of Traditional Tort Law 
a) Corrective Justice 
A central justification for imposing liability is corrective justice. 
According to Aristotelian philosophy, corrective justice is defined 
as a rectification of harm, wrongfully caused by one person to anoth-
er, by means of a direct transfer of resources from the injurer to the 
victim.119 Accordingly, every particular interaction embodies cor-
relative rights and duties that are imposed on both parties. This 
deontological non-consequentialist concept focuses on bilater-
al interactions, which are not reliant on external values. 
Corrective justice theorists offer explanations regarding the du-
ty of rectification. For example, Jules L. Coleman concentrates on 
fault and rights.120 Ernest J. Weinrib and Stephen R. Perry concen-
trate on responsibility.121 George P. Fletcher claims that the basis 
for liability is non-reciprocal risk.122 Thus, liability exists when a 
respondent generates a disproportionate, excessive risk for harm, 
relative to the victim’s risk-creating activity. The entitlement to 
recover a loss is given to all those injured by utilizing non-reciprocal 
risks. The goal is to distinguish between the risks that violate indi-
vidual interests and background risks that must be borne by socie-
ty.123 Theorists explain that causation is not enough for imposition 
                                                                                                                            
119 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1130 (William David Ross trans., 1980). 
120 See Jules L. Colman, Risks and Wrongs, YALE L. SCH. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
REPOSITORY, Jan. 1, 1992, at 324–60; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective 
Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 718 (2003). 
121 Weinrib highlights correlativity by pointing out that tort doctrine constructs the tort 
relationship because liability treats the parties as doer and sufferer of the same injustice. 
See Ariel Porat, Questioning the Idea of Correlativity in Weinrib’s Theory of Corrective 
Justice, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 161, 169 (2001); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral 
Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 489–94 (1992); Stephen R. Perry, The 
Impossibility of General, Strict Liability, 1 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 147, 151 (1998); Ernest J. 
Weinrib, Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 107, 110 (2001). 
122 George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 537–64 
(1972). 
123 Id. 
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of liability.124 Consequently, fault (negligence or moral fault) must 
exist in order to justify compensation for the harm caused.125 
In light of the bilateral correlative nature of torts, the literature 
on corrective justice tended to focus on “first order” liability (the 
liability of those who most directly and wrongfully caused an in-
jury) and not on “second order” liability. However, one may argue 
that content providers create the framework for risk by allowing the 
activity and assisting it. Therefore, providers should be liable for 
the consequences alongside the direct wrongdoer, because a cor-
rective justice concept is also feasible when several wrongdoers 
caused the harm.126 
On the other hand, one may argue that designing and operating 
platforms is merely a background risk. As such, content providers 
(platforms as Yelp and Facebook) do not commit speech torts 
themselves, and, therefore, they bear no fault to the harm caused. 
Instead, the user who defamed the third party would be at fault. 
According to this approach, it is not fair and just to impose liability 
on content providers. 
b) Efficiency 
This significant perspective focuses on the maximization of 
wealth and the efficient allocation of risks. In general, it does not 
take into account deontological considerations.127 According to this 
                                                                                                                            
124 See supra note 121. 
125 Theorist Richard Epstein believes that harm justifies compensation. Richard 
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 151, 157 (1973). This theory of strict 
liability, which focuses on factual causality, is unacceptable and came under criticism. See 
Izhak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort Theory, 9 
J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 63–68 (1980). 
126 Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A 
Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1162 (1988). In that case, every wrongdoer is liable to the plaintiff’s 
damages and can claim subrogation from other wrongdoers. 
127 Richard Allen Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of Efficiency Norm in Common 
Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 492 (1980). 
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perspective, legal rules aim to incentivize efficient conduct ex-ante 
and promote welfare maximization ex-post facto.128 
Scholarly literature usually deals with the economic analysis of 
direct liability, but shies away from discussing third party liability. 
However, in some cases expanding liability to third parties is re-
quired when: (1) the enforcement of liability on the direct tortfea-
sor fails (for example, when the direct tortfeasor cannot be de-
tected); (2) the third-party can monitor and control the direct 
wrongdoers; (3) sufficient incentives do not exist for private order-
ing and non-legal strategies; and (4) a legal rule can be applied at 
reasonable a cost.129 While third-party liability is well established, 
little is known about its appropriate scope. Specifically, legal scho-
larship has little to say about the standard of liability that should 
apply to third parties.130 
In our context, enforcement failure might occur,131 because the 
speaker might be anonymous, and even if he is identified, he might 
not be deep-pocketed. To whom should liability be allocated? Who 
is the cheapest cost avoider? Who should bear the burden of mini-
mizing speech torts’ harms? In the following subsections, I shall 
examine whether efficiency considerations support imposing liabili-
ty on content providers, considering the alternative of letting the 
victim bear the damage. I will refer to the implication of assigning 
liability on content providers and focus on three types of traditional 
                                                                                                                            
128 John R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON J. 646 (1939); 
Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions for Economics and Inter Personal Comparisons of 
Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939). 
129 Douglas G. Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable 
(John M. Olin Program in L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 217, 2004); see also Reinier H. 
Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of Third—Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 53, 53 (1986); Alan Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis 
of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 564 
(1988); Alan Sykes, An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability Under the Law of Agency, 91 
YALE L.J. 168, 168 (1981). 
130 Asaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 57 (2003). 
131 Matthew Schruers, The History and Economics of ISP Liability for Third Party Content, 
88 VA. L. REV. 205, 233 (2002). 
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costs associated with it: primary costs of deterrence, secondary 
costs of loss spreading,132 and administrative litigation costs. 
One may argue that content providers are the cheapest cost 
avoiders of speech torts. They can easily control content on their 
platform. Imposing liability would incentivize providers to monitor 
content on their platform and filter out offensive materials. This 
would improve enforcement and minimize libel that causes more 
harm than good.133 Waiving the liability of content providers in fact 
disincentivizes them from taking precautions, which is reflected in 
inefficient enforcement.134 In addition, content providers have dee-
per pockets than individuals in theory and, therefore, are better 
suited than the victim to reduce secondary costs by bearing the loss 
or spreading it on their users. An increase in administrative litiga-
tion costs should be expected, but imposing liability on content 
providers is better than the alternative of leaving the victim without 
a remedy. This alternative will not bring an efficient deterrence and 
may impose on the victim heavy secondary costs. 
However, in-depth examination reveals that efficiency consid-
erations fail to provide answers regarding the allocation of liability. 
When taking into account overall market characteristics, content 
providers are not the cheapest cost avoiders. Unlike traditional 
media, Internet content providers do not have the time or the re-
sources to review and check every expression on their platform in 
real time.135 Since user-generated content is great and existing 
models are based on extensive accessibility of information, liability 
would burden the rapid flow of information and free speech, thus 
                                                                                                                            
132 Secondary costs are the costs associated with bearing losses. See GUIDO CALABRESI, 
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 38 (1970). Significant 
losses borne by one person are more likely to result in secondary losses (arising from the 
initial damage) than allocating a series of small losses to many people, or large sum of 
losses to deep-pocketed entities. Id. 
133 See Elizabeth M. Jaffe, Imposing a Duty in an Online World: Holding the Web Host 
Liable for Cyberbullying, 35 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 277 (2013). 
134 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY 
ON THE INTERNET 159 (2007); Lichtman & Posner, supra note 129. 
135 For illustration, YouTube users now upload 100 hours of video every minute. See 
supra note 33. 
884 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:855 
 
harming aggregated wealth.136 Therefore, the existing model should 
be preserved and the allocation of risks should fall on the victim’s 
shoulders. Expanding responsibilities to content providers (third 
parties) is not desirable because the utility achieved by improving 
deterrence in the relevant market would be probably lower than its 
costs. 
Imposing legal liability on content providers might not be ne-
cessary, since the reputation of a provider is damaged when a user 
disseminates defaming speech on their platforms. Reputation loss 
often translates into profit loss, fear of which might provide suffi-
cient incentives for private ordering content review. 
Allocating liability to content providers may also increase sec-
ondary costs of spread loss. Erroneous assessment of secondary 
liability risks may lead content providers to increase their service 
prices disproportionately. Content providers are not born equally, 
and they do not all have deep pockets. For example, it would be 
inefficient to impose liability on non-commercial providers. As 
noted above, allocating liability to content providers would cause 
an increase in legal action and rising administrative costs. These 
different considerations make it difficult to assess the most efficient 
allocation of liability. 
c) Efficiency and Technological Innovation 
In the digital age, I cannot discuss allocation of liability without 
referring to technological innovation. The liability regime taxes in-
novation and influences its course.137 The expected liability out-
come ex post facto influences investments in certain types of tech-
                                                                                                                            
136 New technology can filter some forms of speech automatically, but it is prone to 
making mistakes and sometimes over-filtering because expression depends on context. 
See Lital Helman & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Best Available Technology Standard, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 1194, 1234 (2011). 
137 Evidence shows that under liberal liability regimes, innovation thrives; too heavy of a 
burden of liability may stifle innovation. See Kyle Graham, Of Frightened Horses and 
Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and its Assimilation of Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
1241, 1241 (2012); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 285, 314 (2008); Guy Pessach, Deconstructing Disintermediation: A Skeptical 
Copyright Perspective, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 833, 864 (2013). The liability regime 
may affect market innovation and social innovation. See Tal Zarsky, The Privacy–
Innovation Conundrum, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 115, 126 (2015). 
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nologies and the adopted business models,138 both of which play an 
important role in determining efficiency. 
One might argue that a liability rule enabling freedom and 
openness incentivizes entrepreneurs to invest in technological ven-
tures and digital markets. Exempting content providers from liabili-
ty would incentivize the development of many platforms and pro-
mote efficient diversity and optimal investment decisions. Stricter 
liability, however, might stifle innovation. It might impede the sig-
nificant technological progress witnessed in recent years, including 
the increase in productivity and personal satisfaction.139 
Yet, a counter argument might point out that anyone who con-
ducts business of any complexity must consult with a lawyer at 
some point regarding the liability risks. In some cases, despite for-
midable legal regulations, innovation continues. Thus, the concern 
of impeding innovation might be over-stated.140 Since it is impossi-
ble to tell which technologies are abandoned due to the adopted 
liability rule, I would leave this question open without a conclu-
sion.141 
E. Interim Summary: From a Global to a Particular Regulation 
The examination of various liability regimes in different coun-
tries reveals that they are either over- or under-inclusive. Allowing 
complete immunity to providers is difficult to defend, since it 
                                                                                                                            
138 See Dotan Oliar, The Copyright Innovation Trade-off: Property Rules, Liability Rules 
and Intentional Infliction of Harm, 64 STAN. L. REV. 951, 1000 (2012); Pessach, supra note 
137, at 864 (noting that YouTube’s success was due to the copyright liability regime 
(notice-and-takedown)). By and in itself, such a regime does not prevent the popularity of 
a platform and the variety of popular copyrighted content that it hosts on the site. 
139 See ANUPAN CHANDER, THE SILVER SILK ROAD 57 (2013); Yochai Benkler, 
Decentralization, Freedom to Operate & Human Society, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: 
ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 257, 263 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 
2011); Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 
891, 942 (2012); see generally Chander, supra note 41. 
140 Alex Kozinsky & Josh Goldfoot, A Declaration of the Dependence of Cyberspace, in THE 
NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET, supra note 139, at 
176. 
141 See Carrier, supra note 139, at 893. 
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might be over-inclusive142 and might also cause disincentives for 
better behavior by those in the best position to minimize harm. 
Such immunity can foster irresponsibility, increase harm to reputa-
tion, and undermine the victims’ freedom of expression.143 
Distributor-style negligence liability is over-inclusive.144 It 
might cause over deterrence and undermine free speech, efficien-
cy, and innovation. Negligence standards are open standards. In-
terpreting them involves cumbersome litigation and high adminis-
trative costs. In addition, courts are prone to decide inconsistently, 
and they might find it difficult to conduct cost-benefit analyses, 
resulting in uncertainty.145 Negligence regime may also lead to 
hindsight and outcome biases, because reasonable action is normal-
ly decided after the fact.146 Consequently, courts may conclude that 
the content provider had been negligent even if he could not pre-
dict the harm ex ante and acted reasonably. The end result of this 
regime might lead to a serious chilling effect of a defensive take-
down policy, or switching off reader comments sections. 147 
                                                                                                                            
142 See Lichtman & Posner, supra note 129, at 28. Shifting the full costs of accidents to 
content providers’ subscribers would inefficiently reduce their incentives to take care, 
even when the gravity of harm is high. 
143 See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 2, at 193–99; Citron, Cyber 
Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 119; Solove, supra note 134, at 159. With blanket immunity, 
content providers would have no reason to remove false material, or to collect and retain 
the identities of posters. As a result, defamatory posts remain online and often migrate 
across the web, while plaintiffs are unable to recover damages. 
144 These regimes may lead to heavy responsibility, including taking down harmful 
content before getting a complaint from victims. 
145 Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschof, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 
YALE L.J. 1055, 1076 (1972). 
146 See Yoed Halbersberg & Ehud Guttel, Behavioral Economics and Tort Law, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIOR ECONOMICS AND LAW 405, 412 (Zamir & Teichman 
eds., 2014); Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight Is Not Equal to Foresight: The Effect of Outcome 
Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. 
PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975). 
147 The ambiguity regarding liability in Europe has probably led many intermediaries to 
switch off reader comments. See supra Section I.C.2; see also Paul McNally, Guardian 
Digital Chief: Killing Off Comments ‘A Monumental Mistake,’ NEWS:REWIRED (Feb. 3, 
2015, 10:32 AM), https://www.newsrewired.com/2015/02/03/guardian-digital-chief-
killing-off-comments-a-monumental-mistake/ [https://perma.cc/6CFL-6NXS]. 
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Publisher-style strict liability would cause over-deterrence as 
well and would increase the cost of efficient conduct.148 This liabili-
ty regime is not suitable for online content providers;149 and in fact, 
it would lead to a severe “chilling effect” in comparison to other 
regimes. 
A safe-haven provision for entities that take specific precautio-
nary steps (“notice and takedown”) is a compromise that offers 
many advantages. Under this regime, content providers do not 
have to filter content and are not liable to harmful content they 
were not informed about. Content providers who fail to remove 
harmful materials after notification are exposed to liability. This 
legal framework incentivizes content providers to implement pri-
vate enforcement measures. However, this regime might result in 
the removal of any content in response to complaints, even if it is 
not defamatory. The chilling effect of this system may manifest it-
self in the form of a veto power granted to anyone who has an in-
terest to silence speech, including legitimate criticism. And it may 
also promote mass censorship.150 For example, rating and review 
websites would turn into praise websites under this regime, thereby 
making them irrelevant. As a result, consumers will probably lose 
an important and efficient tool in their decision-making process. 
Technological and regulatory mechanisms may solve the ab-
ovementioned problems in various liability regimes: for example, 
imposing transparency obligations on content providers. These ob-
ligations would require providers to articulate the rules for filtering 
content. This strategy might decrease distortions caused by filter-
ing and enable users to understand the extent of censorship. Sub-
jected to transparency and disclosure, content providers might re-
duce unnecessary filtering in order to preserve their reputation as a 
                                                                                                                            
148 Richard Allen Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 29, 30 (1972). 
149 For these differences, see supra Section I.C. 
150 Niva Elkin-Koren, After Twenty Years: Copyright Liability of Online Intermediaries, in 
THE EVOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM OF COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL AGE (Susy Frankel & 
Daniel J. Gervais eds., 2014) (referring to the problem in tangent context of copyrighted 
content and notes that empirical data collected over the past decade confirms this 
concern); Mark D. Quist, Plumbing the Depths of the CDA: Weighing the Competing Fourth 
and Seventh Circuit Standards of ISP Immunity Under Section 230 of the CDA, 20 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 275, 280–81 (2012); Cecilia Ziniti, supra note 41, at 604–07. 
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rich market of ideas.151 In addition, rules might require content 
providers to implement mechanisms, which enable users to partici-
pate in regulation, such as interfaces for labeling and reporting 
harmful content.152 However, the efficiency of these measures is 
doubtful.153 
I believe that a single, overarching regime regulating content 
providers’ liability cannot balance properly the above-mentioned 
normative considerations. It would be insensitive to different on-
line contexts and lead to distortions and improper consequences. 
Instead, context-based regimes are more useful in this regard. Lia-
bility influenced by context has been recognized in legal thinking 
for many years, and perhaps it should be applied online as well.154 
                                                                                                                            
151 Tal Zarsky, Transparency in Content Filtering: A Plan of Attack, 2 HEBREW U. L.J. 
LEGIS. 133, 158–59 (2010). On the importance of imposing transparency obligations on 
online intermediaries in a broader context, see FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX 
SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 59–101 
(2015). 
152 This type of moderation is ex-post organization. See Grimmelman, supra note 1, at 
68. 
153 Transparency requirements might solve the problem of over-filtering because of 
content providers’ private or commercial interests. However, these requirements do not 
solve the problem of over-filtering controversial topics due to the incentive of reducing 
liability risks. In addition, transparency requirements have limitations, and many scholars 
found that mandated disclosure is ill suited to this end. See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. 
SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED 
DISCLOSURE 33–59 (2014); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Even More Than You Wanted to 
Know About the Failures of Disclosure, 11 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 63, 63–74 (2015). 
Regarding mandated reporting and labeling options so that users may participate in 
regulation, this regime might improve regulation in some online contexts. However, in 
other contexts, it may increase distortions in information markets. A broad policy that 
relies exclusively on users recommendations to remove harmful content invites flame 
wars and flag wars, in which competing political activists flag the other sides’ content as 
inappropriate. The result might be removing every non-consensual speech. See SIVA 
VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING AND WHY WE SHOULD WORRY 
39 (2011). On flagging harmful content on Facebook, which may lead to odd results, see 
RICHARDS, supra note 82, at 171–72; Kate Crawford & Tarleton L. Gillespie, What Is a 
Flag for? Social Media Reporting Tools and the Vocabulary of Complaint, NEW MEDIA & 
SOC’Y (2014). 
154 I noted in Section I.A that law distinguishes between different traditional 
intermediaries and applies nuanced context-based rules for regulating activities. In 
addition to the differentiation between commercial speech and political speech, it also 
grants different levels of protection to facts and opinions. See Burt Neuborne, The First 
Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 28–29 
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In the following pages, I shall distinguish between online contexts 
and suggest different nuanced liability regimes, leading to an op-
timal balance between constitutional rights, fairness, economic ef-
ficiency, and technological innovation. 
II. SOCIAL NETWORK PERSPECTIVE: STRONG TIES, WEAK 
TIES, SOCIOLOGICAL DISTINCTIONS, AND TYPES OF 
DISCOURSE 
Since an overarching regime regulating content providers’ lia-
bility is flawed, it is necessary to distinguish between the types of 
content providers and outline the possible differential liability re-
gimes. I offer a descriptive taxonomy based on sociology rather 
than technology. It distinguishes online platforms based on the 
strength of ties formed within them. 
A sociological analysis facilitates an understanding of social 
networks and the strength of ties formed within. It also helps to 
predict which online settings form strong ties. This new taxonomy 
serves as the first step towards applying a differential regime for 
regulating content providers liability, which shall culminate in a 
practical method to settle fundamental legal dilemmas. 
A. A Basic Network Perspective: Towards a Contextual Taxonomy 
Social networks seem to organize social life today.155 They 
spread happiness, generosity, and love. They are always there, ex-
erting both subtle and dramatic influence over our choices, actions, 
thoughts, feelings, and even our desires. Social networks can affect 
the full spectrum of human experience. The ties formed within 
them are crucial to understanding how networks function and the 
way information is shared and circulated within them.156 Through 
                                                                                                                            
(1989); see also Musetta Durkee, The Truth Can Catch the Lie: The Flawed Understanding of 
Online Speech in In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773, 777 
(2011). 
155 Manuel Castells, Afterword: Why Networks Matter, in NETWORK LOGIC: WHO 
GOVERNS IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD? 221 (2004). 
156 NICHOLAS A. CHRISTAKIS & JAMES FOWLER, CONNECTED: THE SURPRISING POWER 
OF OUR SOCIAL NETWORKS AND HOW THEY SHAPE OUR LIVES 7–9 (2009). 
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the prisms of social networks, a new understanding of social dy-
namics and information can be identified. 
Network theory describes the relations between discrete ob-
jects: how they connect and how those connections are created, 
grow, and change.157 Sociologists are concerned with social net-
works and their effect on communication patterns. Their focus is 
on the ties between individuals rather than what they think or do 
on their own.158 These ties influence interactions and information 
exchanges between individuals. The strength of these ties range from 
weak to strong. 
A few decades ago, researchers identified various ties of differ-
ent strengths, mapping their features and meaning. Mark Grano-
vetter, a pioneer in this field, laid the foundation for the distinction 
between strong and weak ties.159 Strong ties are characterized by 
four factors: (1) time and duration of the relationship; (2) emotion-
al intensity; (3) intimacy (social confiding); and (4) reciprocity. 
Each of these factors is independent of the other, though the set is 
intra-related.160 The strength of ties influences characteristics of 
relationships and implicates information flows through them. 
Weak ties are usually circumstantial and connect heterogene-
ous acquaintances from different social circles. Strong ties, on the 
other hand, usually connect homogenous individuals, characterized 
by social similarity and overlapping social circles. Different ties 
                                                                                                                            
157 I focus here on social networks and sociological theory. On networks from the exact 
sciences perspective, see ALBERT-LÁSZLÓ BARABÁSI, LINKED: THE NEW SCIENCE OF 
NETWORKS 199–214 (2002); DUNCAN WATTS, SIX DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A 
CONNECTED AGE 43–68 (2009). 
158 BARABÁSI, supra note 157; CHARLES KADUSHIN, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL 
NETWORKS: THEORIES, CONCEPTS, AND FINDINGS 27 (2011); LEE RAINIE & BARRY 
WELLMAN, NETWORKED: THE NEW SOCIAL OPERATING SYSTEM 42 (2012); Caroline 
Haythornthwaite, Social Networks and Internet Connectivity Effects, 8 INFO. COMM. & 
SOC’Y 125, 127 (2005). 
159 Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360, 1361 (1973). A 
decade later, another study confirmed these conclusions. See Mark S. Granovetter, The 
Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1 SOC. THEORY 201, 201 (1983). “The 
strength of weak ties” has become a canonical text in the study of social networks. Id. 
160 Alongside weak and strong ties, a network may contain intermediary ties. See Lior 
Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 359, 365 (2003). 
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thus fulfill different functions. Weak ties are particularly instru-
mental. They function quite well at bridging non-overlapping in-
formation pools and facilitating searches for impersonal stand-
alone information.161 Information carried through them is wide-
spread. However, they are not a particularly successful means of 
transmitting complex personal knowledge. In contrast, information 
transmitted via strong ties might be complex and personal. It gen-
erally spreads less quickly, but is more accurate and credible.162 
B. Sociology: Not Technology 
This Article focuses on digital networks. Yet, the proposed tax-
onomy is based on sociological analysis, rather than technology. At 
first glance, this strategy might seem surprising. A technology-
based approach, imposing liability rules depending on technology, 
might appear more effective. However, this is not the case for three 
reasons. First, technology develops unexpectedly and changes fast-
er than the legislative process.163 A technology-based regulation is 
bound to become obsolete and might not fit the next innovation. 
The outcome would result with uncertainty and confusion. Second, 
a technology-based approach might have a negative effect on inno-
vation and bar progress.164 Third, a technology specific regulation 
might promote technological solutions that would circumvent sta-
tutory limitations.165 
                                                                                                                            
161 Weak ties are particularly important in spreading gossip and news. The chief 
advantage of information diffusion through weak ties stems from the rapidity with which 
information is transmitted between different close-knit groups. See Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 955 (2005). 
162 See Strahilevitz, supra note 161, at 956. 
163 NICHOLAS CARR, THE GLASS CAGE: AUTOMATION AND US 40 (2014); Peter F. 
Drucker, The New Society of Organizations, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1992, at 95, 96 
(“It is the nature of knowledge that it changes fast and that today’s certainties always 
become tomorrow’s absurdities.”). 
164 See Michael Birnhack, Reverse Engineering Information Privacy Law, 15 YALE J. L. & 
TECH. 24, 39 (2013). 
165 For example, The U.S. recording industry’s trade association sued Napster. See 
Zittrain, supra note 13, at 274. The lengthy litigation itself spawned a number of new 
technologies to fill in Napster’s shoes, which resulted in a new round of lawsuits designed 
to stymie Napster’s successors. See id. 
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The preference of the sociological approach is not arbitrary. On 
the contrary, applying social network theory to assist regulating 
speech torts is natural. In fact, there are significant justifications for 
preferring social context based taxonomy to any other classifica-
tion. Speech torts are not committed in a vacuum. In most circums-
tances, we hear the social context of speech, as much as we under-
stand the content of communication. Thus, defamation is often in 
the ear of the listener, depending on context.166 
Reliance on social contexts is rooted in defamation law.167 
When determining the level of damages, courts take into account 
the seriousness of defamation and the nature and extent of publica-
tion.168 Other relevant factors include the prominence of the publi-
cation, the credence recipients ascribe to it and the parties’ (speak-
er and victim) conduct.169 These factors are fundamentally related 
to the structure of the network and social contexts of the flow of 
information. The strength of the social ties affects social structures 
and influences the perception of speech by the recipients. The 
speaker and recipient’s conduct is also affected by social dynamics 
within the social network. Thus, the strength of ties affects the 
gravity of the harm to reputation. 
                                                                                                                            
166 See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Ollman test 
requires consideration of a statement’s precision, verifiability, literary context and social 
context when separating fact from opinion. See COLLINS, supra note 89, at 8.43–.55 
(addressing the role of context in interpreting defenses); see also Brooks Fuller, Evaluating 
Intent in True Threats Cases: The Importance of Context in Analyzing Threatening Internet 
Messages, 37 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 37, 40 (2015) (noting the importance of 
context in interpreting a threatening Internet message); Rodney W. Ott, Fact and Opinion 
in Defamation: Recognizing the Formative Power of Context, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 762 
(1990); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, 
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L REV. 603, 640 
(1990). Recently, the Supreme Court overturned a conviction regarding online threats, 
preferring narrow subjective interpretation of context. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. 
Ct. 2001, 2016 (2015). However, this narrow approach stems from the focus on general 
criminal principles. See id. 
167 See COLLINS, supra note 89, at 6.29 (noting that the context in which the statement 
made is relevant in ascertaining whether it conveys defamatory meaning). Thus, even 
offensive, appalling, and outrageous statements may have no capacity to affect the 
attitude of others towards a claimant if those to whom they were published dismissed 
them as part of a rough tumble of the context in which they were made. See id. 
168 See id. 
169 See id. at 21.4–.7. 
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C. The Quality of Online Ties 
Networks have always existed, but the networks we form today 
exploit different tools and operate in a different environment. The 
triple revolution of the Internet, mobile phones, and social network 
sites upgraded our ability to stay in touch with one another. This 
revolution afforded new opportunities to form social ties, share 
ideas, form communities, and engage in diverse social dynamics 
anywhere, anytime.170 
After showing that strong ties can be formed online,171 sociolo-
gists characterized the factors that online ties depend on. Based on 
empirical studies and findings, Professors Gusstavo Mesch and Ilan 
Talmud mapped three social factors affecting the quality of online 
ties: (1) social similarity (homophily); (2) duration of the relation-
ship; and (3) multiplexity (different dimensions of relationship).172 
Thus, online ties, similarly to offline ties, include many types of 
interactions and allow emotional support. Ongoing relationships 
generate a shared history, and they reinforce a sense of belonging, 
shared identity, as well as trust.173 
The Internet is not a monolithic medium. It consists of many 
platforms and different types of ties. Applying the social factors 
laid by Mesh and Talmud (similarity, duration, and multiplexity) 
enables one to predict the strength of ties formed in practice within 
different platforms and online contexts. Thus, platforms facilitating 
                                                                                                                            
170 See CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, supra note 156, at 275; RAINIE & WELLMAN, supra note 
158, at 126. 
171 See Sara Kiesler & Lee Sproul, Reducing Social Context Cues: Electronic Mail in 
Organizational Communication, 32 MGMT. SCI. 1492, 1497 (1986) (reaching the conclusion 
that the creation of strong ties is impossible online). On the other hand, many studies 
concluded that strong ties can be formed on the Internet. See, e.g., Richard L. Daft & 
Robert H. Lengel, Organizational Information Requirements Media Richness and Structural 
Design, 32 MGMT. SCI. 554 (1986); see also Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin & James 
M. Cook, Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 415, 418 
(2001). For an extensive review, see Gustavo Mesch, Online Communities, in HANDBOOK 
OF COMMUNITY MOVEMENTS AND LOCAL ORGANIZATION 227, 236 (Ram A. Cnaan & 
Carl Milofsky eds., 2007). 
172 Gustavo Mesch & Ilan Talmud, The Quality of Online and Offline Relationships The 
Role of Multiplexity and Duration of Social Relationships, 22 INFO. SOC’Y 137, 137 (2006). 
173 Strahilevitz, supra note 161, at 952–53; Caroline Haythornthwaite, Strong, Weak, and 
Latent Ties and the Impact of New Media, 18 INFO. SOC’Y 385, 388 (2002). 
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anonymity require meeting unknown people constantly. These 
platforms hinder the potential for forming strong ties. In contrast, 
facilitating traceable pseudonymity enables an interaction with 
consistent personalities, with whom we can transact directly and 
carry out two-way conversations.174 This option offers a potential 
for forming strong ties. The following discussion will outline an 
innovative taxonomy of digital conduct and conversation premised 
on the social factors mentioned above. Afterwards, I will apply the 
taxonomy to tort law. 
D. From General Principles to Specific Application: A Contextual 
Taxonomy 
Various applications, tools, and social platforms dominate the 
new online generation dubbed “Web 2.0.” This new generation 
relies on constant contributions and social interactions, and it en-
courages the flow of information.175 Different strengths of ties have 
structured central junctures for information dissemination.176 
However, the context of the information and its dissemination vary 
depending on the technology used. Distinguishing between differ-
ent strengths of ties is very important; but applying the sociological 
insights to the law is complex. Courts seem to lack the tools to dis-
tinguish between platforms based on the strength of ties on a case-
by-case basis. They should not wait for a comprehensive sociologi-
cal study on the ties formed in a specific platform. Drawing on so-
ciological insights, I outline a descriptive innovative taxonomy of 
online platforms. 
I believe that three different categories of platforms can be 
identified according to the strength of ties. The first is freestyle 
                                                                                                                            
174 Grimmelman, supra note 1, at 76; Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the Box: 
Considering Transparency, Anonimity and Pseudonymity as Overall Solutions to the Problems 
of Information Privacy in the Internet Society, 58 MIAMI L. REV. 1301, 1340–44 (2004). 
175 See CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT 
ORGANIZATION 81 (2008); Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: 
Standard Form Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 303, 330 (2008). 
176 Strahilevitz, supra note, 161 at 956 (commenting that information dissemination 
through the wider society often depends on weak ties). However, there will be certain 
types of information that do not lend themselves to communication via weak ties. See id. 
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conversation, which is conducted in an open spontaneous format 
(such as message boards) without supervision and guidance. The 
platform is a juncture for information dissemination while the ties 
among the participants are weak. The second is peer production, 
which connects distant heterogeneous participants to a common 
goal by sharing and creating information in a decentralized peer 
based model. Most social ties in these platforms are weak. Howev-
er, embedded technical interfaces allow the aggregation, the inte-
gration, and the review of the shared information. The third cate-
gory is deliberation and structuring communities, which are 
created by specific users. This category carries out two-way con-
versations and can transmit complex and personal information. In 
this context, strong and intermediary ties may form. 
This taxonomy focuses on central conversation types and does 
not purport to encompass all platforms or future platforms. Even if 
new online platforms evolve, the same methodology could still be 
used and assist in formulating proper liability rules. The analysis 
would map new conversation contexts adjusting them to the exist-
ing taxonomy, which would, in turn, determine the scope of liabili-
ty. 
1. Freestyle Conversation 
“Mega scum bag! . . . Cockroach! . . . Someone who knows”177 
[routine and representative of many comments in freestyle conver-
sation]. 
A popular type of online conversations is “freestyle.” It is 
spontaneous and immediate without central supervision and guid-
ance. It is broadly accessible, and it is directed at a non-specific au-
dience.178 The platform offers an equal and non-hierarchical envi-
ronment.179 Often, a large number of speakers participate in a con-
versation, which is held in real time. In most cases, the conversa-
                                                                                                                            
177 See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1159 (2008). 
178 See Roy Goldshmidt, Talk-backs in the Israeli Public Discourse, (Knesset Research and 
Info. Dep’t, 2006); Yuval Karniel, Defamation on the Internet: A New Approach to Libel in 
Cyberspace, 2 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 215, 216 (2009). 
179 The absence of constant pseudonyms prevents hierarchy. All participants are equal, 
and everyone can equally answer back. 
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tion is anonymous, and no registration is required to participate. 
Thus, most users use monikers rather than their real names or con-
stant pseudonym. Every participant speaks at will, expresses him-
self in front of the general audience, and usually posts comments 
with little thought or preparation. At present, some content pro-
viders allow real name comments, by integrating social media plu-
gins.180 However, even in these situations participants comment 
freely, without constraints. The magnitude and frequency of com-
ments affects the quality of conversation, and the information dif-
fused is a mixture of facts and opinions.181 
Freestyle conversation characterizes “talkbacks”—comments 
to an online article, especially in news sites; online message boards; 
websites devoted to public comments; and open-wide forums.182 
Absence of significant mediation reinforces the spontaneous di-
mensions and increases the pleasure derived from participating.183 
Participants of these conversations are not professional reporters 
and are not subjected to ethical norms or disciplinary rules. They 
have no defined goals or commitments to other participants and do 
not form virtual communities. 
a) Strength of Ties in Freestyle Conversation 
Freestyle conversation is optimized to support weak ties. The 
formation of strong ties should not be assumed within this online 
setting. As illustrated below, this conclusion is consistent with the 
                                                                                                                            
180 Currently, there are two classes of freestyle comments. See Brian Honigman, 6 
Effective Ways to Integrate Social Media with Your E-Commerce Website, SMB & E-
COMMERCE TRENDS (Nov. 13, 2013), http://blog.sumall.com/journal/integrate-social-
media-e-commerce.html [https://perma.cc/AN5B-EQLM]. The first is the traditional 
class of comments. This class is characterized by anonymity and absence of hierarchy. 
The second class is social based comments. Speakers are connected to their social 
networks profiles and participate via real names (ostensibly). In this case, speakers can 
delete their comments themselves after the fact. Some content providers define 
participants who respond frequently as “leading commentators.” See id. 
181 SHIRKY, supra note 175, at 90; Goldshmidt, supra note 178; Grimmelman, supra note 
1, at 72. 
182 For example, see the comment sections of The Boston Globe and The Delfi. 
183 See Yaacov Hecht, The Struggle for Supremacy in the Online Content Market the Case of 
Talkbacks, ISRAELI INTERNET ASS’N (Nov. 2003), www.isoc.org.il/magazine/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y5EL-5QD8] (discussing the special nature of discussions in 
talkbacks). 
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factors laid by Mesch and Talmud (similarity, duration and multip-
lexity) for evaluating the strength of social ties. These factors will be 
discussed below. 
First, with the similarity factor, conversation does not appeal to 
specific audience and participants are often random users. Fur-
thermore, it is not characterized by in-depth discussions. The net-
work of participants is very large and heterogeneous.184 In cases 
where conversation is held anonymously, it is near impossible to 
characterize the participants. 
Next, with the duration factor, conversation is spontaneous and 
held ad hoc, in the heat of the moment. It is characterized by im-
mediacy and does not last long.185 Furthermore, the number of par-
ticipants is large.186 It is also hard to evaluate the reputation of the 
participants in this setting.187 
Lastly, with the multiplexity factor, the conversation revolves 
around general topics (for example, comment to an online story). 
The content of conversation is impersonal and does not generate 
intimacy; the participants are not connected in multiple activities. 
These characteristics affect the credibility attributed to the 
speech published in the various settings. They are perceived by In-
ternet users as low-level and even weightless.188 Surveys indicate 
                                                                                                                            
184 In exceptional cases, when conversation has a specific and focused subject, the 
participants might be homogeneous. However, even in these cases, strong ties will not 
form due to the absence of the other factors: duration and multiplexity. 
185 Thus, participants post their comments, talkbacks, within comment sections right 
after the online story is published. The conversation is held ad hoc and, therefore, 
ongoing interactions are not expected. 
186 See SHIRKY, supra note 175, at 90 (noting that the number of participants implicates 
the potential for bi-directional conversation). 
187 The platform might define “leading participants” in cases of social-based comment 
systems, connected to social network profiles, and enable to track participation. See 
Strahilevitz, supra note 160, at 360. However, this definition cannot signal the value and 
quality of comments. See id. It only signals that the participant is generally active and 
posts comments frequently. See id. In light of these characteristics, intermediary ties are 
also not expected to form in this type of conversation. See id. 
188 See Karniel, supra note 178, at 216; see also Jacob Rowbottom, To Rant, Vent and 
Converse: Protecting Low Level Digital Speech, 71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 355, 377 (2012) (referring 
to the case Clift v. Clarke). In Clift v. Clarke, two users of the defendant’s website posted 
comments, which the court found to be flippant, unserious comments. Clift v. Clarke 
[2011] EWHC (QB) 1164 [36] (Eng.) (“The postings are in reality, it seems to me, no 
898 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:855 
 
that most Internet users do not read comments at all and conceive 
them as worthless.189 This perception does not change even when 
commentators use their real identities. Despite the negative per-
ception, this form of conversation has value in promoting free 
speech. The absence of strong ties among participants emphasizes 
the autonomy of the individual speaker and promotes self-
fulfillment. In addition, freestyle conversation promotes the market 
of ideas and participatory democracy.190 As noted above, informa-
tion flows in freestyle conversations have been discussed in the le-
gal literature191 and in judicial rulings.192 However, the focus was 
not on the strength of ties. 
2. Peer Production 
This was by far the worst experience I have ever en-
countered with a locksmith. Do not go through this 
company . . . . The gentlemen on the phone told me 
that a technician would be out ASAP and quoted me 
$50 for the service . . . . After the technician finally 
showed up, he was trying to charge me $35 for the 
service call and $175 for the lock . . . . Call this busi-
ness at your own risk. –Sara K.193 [one of many di-
versified reviews on the famous review platform 
Yelp]. 
                                                                                                                            
more than ‘pub talk,’ as it has sometimes been described, and I consider it fanciful to 
suggest any reasonable sensible reader would construe them in any other way.”). 
Similarly, in the United States, some courts considered this conversation as unreliable 
and, therefore, declined to unmask defaming anonymous speakers. See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 
159 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1175 (“In this case, Doe 6’s messages, viewed in context, cannot 
be interpreted as asserting or implying objective facts.”). 
189 A survey conducted by the Geocartography Institute found that most Internet users 
do not take an interest in online comments. Adar Shalev, New Poll: Most Users Do Not 
Read Talkbacks, YNET (July 11, 2007), http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-
3468737,00.html [https://perma.cc/7BMK-QQ8X]. 
190 Freestyle conversations fuel rumors, but they also potentially promote the search for 
truth. They also facilitate information flows about government. This realm is equally 
accessible to everyone and encourages participatory culture. Thus, freestyle leads to the 
materialization of the constitutional right of free expression. 
191 See Karniel, supra note 178; Rowbottom, supra note 188, at 374, 377. 
192 See, e.g., supra note 188. 
193 See Kimzey v. Yelp Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1121–22 (2014). 
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In this form of communication, thousands of volunteers colla-
borate in sharing their contributions in a decentralized peer-based 
model, rather than on market- or hierarchy-based production. In-
formation is formed and governed by participants, but each contri-
bution is produced independently of the others.194 This model de-
pends on many heterogeneous individuals animated by diverse mo-
tivations.195 An important advantage of this type of conversation is 
the ability to aggregate, accumulate, and integrate information from 
different sources at a low cost. 
Technical interfaces embedded within platforms enable the in-
tegration of contributions from different sources. These systems, 
combined with the participants’ efforts, facilitate reputation me-
chanisms and enable efficient judgment of quality, trustworthiness, 
and relevance. These mechanisms add weight to the text and re-
duce judgment biases.196 They also allow users to see the overall 
market of ideas regarding specific issues. 
Ubiquitous computer communication networks cause a dramat-
ic change in the scope, scale, and efficacy of peer production 
throughout the information and cultural production systems. Thus, 
many online peer-production projects are formed.197 Wikipedia, a 
multilingual encyclopedia coauthored by volunteers who create, 
edit, and correct entries on familiar topics, is one particularly effec-
                                                                                                                            
194 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 59–62 (2006) [hereinafter 
BENKLER, WEALTH OF NETWORKS]; TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 296; 
Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 
426 (2002) [hereinafter Benkler, Coase’s Penguin]. 
195 For more on the importance of heterogeneity and diversity, see JEFF HOWE, 
CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS 
131 (2009); SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES 
BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 133–97 (2007); CASS R. SUNSTEIN & 
REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK TO MAKE GROUPS SMARTER 148 
(2015). 
196 Online feedback mechanisms, such as on eBay, enable a better evaluation of 
information. These mechanisms, also known as reputation systems, are building trust 
among strangers and fostering cooperation in online marketplaces. See HOWARD 
RHEINGOLD, SMART MOBS: THE NEXT SOCIAL REVOLUTION 113, 126 (2002); Benkler, 
Coase’s Penguin, supra note 194, at 390–96; Chrysanthos Dellarocas, The Digitization of 
Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms, 49 MGMT. SCI. 
1407, 1418 (2003). 
197 See BENKLER, WEALTH OF NETWORKS, supra note 194, at 68. 
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tive example. Entries about breaking events appear almost instant-
ly, and volunteers can correct any given error in Wikipedia in a 
heartbeat. This correction mechanism turns Wikipedia into a ro-
bust model of reasonably reliable information.198 
Many websites are based on peer-production models for aggre-
gating and sharing information. Slashdot, a news-aggregating web-
site, is a decentralized system for coproducing opinions and sharing 
knowledge on technology with hundreds of thousands of active us-
ers. The submissions are typically a link to an off-site story, 
coupled with commentary from the person who submits the piece. 
Slashdot facilitates peer recognition. In the comments section, it 
forms accreditation of peer review after the fact. Filtering and ac-
creditation of comments on Slashdot are based on peer ratings of 
comments and allow users to filter out low quality comments. To-
gether these mechanisms allow for distributed production of both 
relevance and accreditation.199 
Peer production is the economic engine of user-based review 
sites and rating services, such as Yelp200 and RateMyProfessors.201 
These platforms gather reviews, aggregate, and display them. They 
are commonly characterized by transparency, thus, participants 
can easily view recent activities on the site.202 Crowd-sourced me-
thods are typically in use to rank the reviews. These voting me-
                                                                                                                            
198 See id. at 71 (pointing out that the journal Nature compared forty-two articles from 
Wikipedia to the standard set by Encyclopedia Britannica, and the journal concluded that 
the difference in accuracy was not particularly great); JONATHAN L. ZITTRAIN: THE 
FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 137 (2008); Grimmelman, supra note 1, 
at 79. 
199 See BENKLER, WEALTH OF NETWORKS, supra note 194, at 76–77, 255; SLASHDOT, 
http://slashdot.org [https://perma.cc/2Q6W-FWRU] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
200 Yelp is a popular American website for customers’ recommendations on small 
businesses. See YELP, http://www.yelp.com [https://perma.cc/8S33-UJBD] (last visited 
May 22, 2016). 
201 Rate My Professors is a peer-production platform for professor reviews and ratings 
based on student feedback. See RATE MY PROFESSORS, http://www.ratemy
professors.com [https://perma.cc/97HP-4V8C] (last visited Mar. 1, 2016). 
202 For example, Yelp’s homepage displays the recent reviews contributed to the 
platforms and allows other participants to disagree with them. On the importance of 
transparency for correcting errors, see BETH SIMONE NOVECK, WIKI GOVERNMENT: HOW 
TECHNOLOGY CAN MAKE GOVERNMENT BETTER, DEMOCRACY STRONGER, AND CITIZENS 
MORE POWERFUL 80–82 (2009). 
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chanisms enable participants to flag reviews as useful and credible. 
Furthermore, some review sites also enable participants to attach a 
list of users they rely on. These mechanisms and strategies enable 
participants to establish online reputation, improve the quality of 
contributions and allow a better evaluation of their credibility. De-
spite the nuanced differences between the platforms, all of them 
aim to achieve a similar goal: peer-production creation and the ag-
gregation of information. 
a) The Strength of Ties in Peer-Production Platforms 
Peer-production conversation is optimized to support weak ties 
at best. The formation of strong ties cannot be assumed within this 
online setting. However, among clusters of repeat players, forming 
small-world networks within the network,203 intermediary ties 
might be formed. In the following Section, I shall discuss this me-
thod of communication, evaluating the strength of social ties that 
could be formed. Below, I will discuss the factors established by 
Mesch and Talmud in this peer-production context. 
Regarding the similarity factor, the number of volunteers con-
tributing to this type of conversation is large. It includes different 
participants characterized by variety of goals and motivations. In 
light of this, I conclude the network is heterogeneous. 
With the duration factor, some peer-production platforms do 
not allow participation with constant user names. Consequently, 
opportunities for continuing interactions are denied and partici-
pants are unable to identify one another. Instead, they connect ran-
domly. Other platforms enable registration and participation via 
pseudonym or real names; however, most participants are not re-
peat players.204 Conversations are held ad hoc, not directed at any-
one in particular. Thus, it is not characterized by reciprocity or 
continuance. However, I would like to note that in some cases, core 
participants might contribute to the project regularly and generate 
                                                                                                                            
203 BARABÁSI, supra note 157, at 51; KADUSHIN, supra note 158, at 128; WATTS, supra 
note 157, at 54. 
204 See SHIRKY, supra note 175, at 122. Most of the participants are one-time shooters, 
and every one adds a small contribution. However, within this “small world,” there 
might be repeat players. 
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opportunities for continuing interaction among themselves. These 
core participants constitute a “small world” of repeat players ac-
tive on the platform that is not characterized by long-term interac-
tion.205 This group might influence the overall interaction of the 
conversation medium. 
Finally, with the multiplexity factor, conversation is focused on 
the topic of production rather than on diversified or personal top-
ics. Since most users are not repeat players, there is a low probabili-
ty for developing a personal dimension in the conversation. 
I would like to reiterate in conclusion that strong ties are not 
likely to form in this type of conversation. When a platform allows 
participation via constant user names and bi-directional conversa-
tion, intermediary ties might form among repeat players. However, 
in the absence of similarity and due to the focus on specific produc-
tion project, the formation of strong ties is not likely. Peer-
production conversations are important for promoting free speech. 
Absence of strong ties among participants, combined with the plat-
form’s features of aggregating heterogeneous contributions creates a 
de facto “market of ideas.” In addition, peer-production conversa-
tion promotes autonomy and democracy.206 
3. Deliberation and Structuring Communities 
Can’t believe what a snake my boss is . . . I know, I 
know everyone warned me . . . it’s hard to ex-
plain . . . basically, the MRI tech is getting paid for 
doing MRI even though he’s not registered and my-
self, nor the CT tech are getting paid for our 
                                                                                                                            
205 Id. at 212–24; KADUSHIN, supra note 158, at 66–67. 
206 In addition to promoting the search of truth and free market of ideas, peer-
production conversation reflects autonomy because every contribution reflects the beliefs 
of the individual volunteer who posted it. The promotion of democracy is another 
byproduct of peer-production conversation. In this conversation, individuals acquire a lot 
of information and are exposed to diverse opinions. This information might assist them in 
reaching decisions that are more efficient or criticize the government. This type of 
conversation also reflects participatory dimension since every volunteer contributing to 
the project shapes this realm and develops democratic culture. 
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areas . . . . And he needs to keep his creepy hands to 
himself . . . . –Sara DeBord207 [a post on Facebook]. 
Howard Rheingold, one of the pioneering sociologists of online 
culture, defined virtual communities as social aggregations that 
emerge from the Internet when enough people carry on public dis-
cussions long enough, displaying sufficient human feeling to form 
webs of personal relationships.208 Conversations whose foci are de-
liberation and structuring communities fit this definition. This cat-
egory is not monolithic and incorporates several online communi-
cation channels. In general, this type of conversation is characte-
rized by specific audience of repeat players, bi-directional commu-
nication, and ongoing interaction among participants. Platforms 
supporting this type of conversation normally allow registration via 
constant pseudonym or real names, and as a result, hierarchy among 
the participants might form. Conversation is characterized by mu-
tual feedback and social approval. It revolves around specific topics 
or particular participants. This conversation type structures social 
relationships, reciprocal social norms, and trust. The Internet faci-
litates the formation of diversified social communities. The follow-
ing are the three main categories of this conversation type: online 
forums, weblogs, and microblogs. 
First, online forums allow conversations on specific topics and 
might be attended by hundreds of participants. Every participant 
may open a discussion or join ongoing conversations. In many fo-
rums, moderators and community managers assist in organizing 
and guiding discussions.209 Different forums appear to include dif-
ferent attributes and traits,210 but all forums promote deliberations 
                                                                                                                            
207 DeBord v. Mercy Health Sys. of Kansas, Inc., 737 F.3d 642, 648 (10th Cir. 2013). 
The plaintiff in this case wrote a post claiming her boss corrupted and overpaid certain 
employees. Id. The claims regarding overpayment were investigated by human resources 
and found to be false. Id. at 649. The plaintiff tried to use this post to support a 
harassment claim, but failed. Id. at 655. 
208 See generally HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON 
THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER (2000). 
209 They aspire to organize discussion, form stability, and guard the boundaries of 
community. See Karine Barzilai-Nahon, Gatekeepers, Virtual Communities and the Gated: 
Multidimensional Tensions in Cyberspace, 11 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 5, 15 (2006). 
210 There are different types of forums, such as conversation forums and support 
forums. Furthermore, different forums revolve around different topics, affecting the 
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and hold a potential of forming strong ties among community par-
ticipants. Most of these online platforms require participants to 
register via constant name–real name or regular pseudonym. This 
enables the ongoing discussions of repeat players. The participants 
are interested in the same topic and tend to be relatively homogen-
ous. Thus, intimacy within this conversation type is likely.211 
Second, blogs (weblogs) consist of posts typically displayed in 
reverse-chronological order themed on a variety of topics and sub 
topics (personal experiences, news, politics, etc.),212 for different 
purposes and audiences.213 Participants can read these posts, then 
comment and discuss their content. At first glance, it seems that 
the individual author is at the center and the blog focuses on him. 
However, a closer look reveals that blogs are normally characte-
rized by regular and occasional commentators and function within 
a network of other blogs that link each other.214 Thus, chains of 
blogs organize around specific topics and communities of inter-
est.215 This type of conversation platform is characterized by a con-
                                                                                                                            
interaction. See, e.g., SUPPORTGROUPS.COM, http://www.supportgroups.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/3G2N-MBNV] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
211 Studies have shown that a high degree of intimacy exists in support forums and, to a 
lesser degree, in conversation forums. See, e.g., Azy Barak & Orit Gluck-Ofri, Degree and 
Reciprocity of Self-Disclosure in Online Forums, 10 CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 407, 407 
(2007). Strong ties may form within online forums, and the interaction might even cross 
the virtual boundaries. See, e.g., RHEINGOLD, supra note 208, at xvi–xix (describing his 
social experiences at the WELL community). 
212 Blogs are very popular worldwide, with more than 77% of Internet users reading 
blogs and more than 133 million blogs appearing in the Internet search engine 
“Technocrati.” See Power to the People Social Media Tracker Wave 3, UNIVERSAL MCCANN 
3, 18 (2008). 
213 See generally Michael A. Stefanone & Chyng-Yang Jang, Writing for Friends and 
Family: The Interpersonal Nature of Blogs, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 123 (2008) 
(describing blogs that are used for social purposes and the preservation of interpersonal 
relations). Another example is the political blog that challenges traditional media. See 
Thomas J. Johnson, Barbara K. Kaye, Shannon L. Bichard & W. Joann Wong, Every Blog 
Has Its Day: Politically-Interested Internet Users’ Perceptions of Blog Credibility, 13 J. 
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 100, 102 (2007). 
214 For example, the popular blog Daily Kos created a progressive political community. 
See DAILY KOS, http://www.dailykos.com/diaries [https://perma.cc/J393-ASPR] (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2016). 
215 Blogs usually link to similar blogs. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 146–50 
(2007). 
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stant specific audience of readers and commentators, using their 
real names or regular pseudonyms.216 
Finally, alongside traditional blogs, microbloging services have 
evolved. Twitter is a prominent example of such a service. It is 
primarily directed to mobile devices. It allows users to post and 
read texts of up to 140 characters, known as “tweets,” and it up-
dates users that choose to follow a particular person. Twitter func-
tions as an online social network. It enables users to attach tweets, 
repeat them (“retweet”), share links, and foster social ideas. The 
immediacy and accessibility of the service have led to its prolifera-
tion.217 
Social networks are web-based services that allow individuals to 
(1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded sys-
tem; (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a con-
nection; and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and 
those made by others within the system. The nature and nomencla-
ture of these connections may vary from site to site.218 
The design and interfaces of the network has significant impli-
cations on the types of social interactions.219 Members of social 
networks can generate ties of different strengths and are motivated 
to join these sites to connect with friends and strengthen ties with 
new acquaintances. Thus, many ties are formed because of mutual 
interests or shared activities.220 In contrast to online forums and 
blogs that revolve around certain topics and communities of inter-
est, social networks are structured on personal—or “egocen-
                                                                                                                            
216 The blogger is a repeat player and has a constant identity, pseudonym, or real name. 
The commentators are usually composed of repeat players. The blog allows a blogger to 
form a more direct relationship with friends and new people. See Dario De Notaris, Social 
Networks Sites and Life-Sharing, 5 POSTMODERN OPENINGS 103, 110 (2011). 
217 See id. 
218 Danah Boyd & Nicole Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and 
Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 211 (2008); James Grimmelmann, 
Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L REV. 1137, 1142 (2009). 
219 See IAN BROWN & CHRISTOPHER T. MARSDEN, REGULATING CODE: GOOD 
GOVERNANCE AND BETTER REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE 118 (2013); 
Grimmelman, supra note 218, at 1143. 
220 Sebastián Valenzuela, Namsu Park & Kerk F. Kee, Is There Social Capital in a Social 
Network Site?: Facebook Use and College Students’ Life Satisfaction, Trust, and Participation, 
14 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 875, 876 (2009). 
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tric”—networks, with the individual at the center of his or her own 
community. This mirrors unmediated social structures more accu-
rately, where the world is composed of networks rather than 
groups.221 Persistent usage of these platforms amplifies users’ life 
satisfaction, reciprocity, social trust, and civic participation.222 So-
cial networks also allow the promotion of collective initiatives of 
civic value.223 
As of today, the most prominent social network is Facebook.224 
This social network is composed of regular repeat players, who are 
rather homogenous. Communication is bi-directional and applies to 
a regular, constant audience. Social networks are popular and rele-
vant more than ever:225 new applications, developed for mobile de-
vices, such as smartphones and tablets, allow constant extensive 
connection to social network platforms in real time, increasing their 
appeal and popularity.226 
a) The Strength of Ties in Online Realms for Deliberation 
and Structuring Communities 
Formats that promote deliberations and communities are opti-
mized to facilitate strong ties. In the following Section, I shall dem-
onstrate how the conditional factors for the formation of strong ties 
are reflected in this conversation’s characteristics. As conducted in 
                                                                                                                            
221 See DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF NETWORKED TEENS 7–
8 (2014); Boyd & Ellison, supra note 218, at 219. 
222 See Valenzuela, supra note 220, at 881. 
223 Technical tools embedded within social networks, combined with motivation and 
social norms, have brought the promotion of public involvement, cooperation, and civic 
engagement. These tools enable the removal of barriers to collective action. For 
expansion on this point, see CLAY SHIRKY, COGNITIVE SURPLUS: CREATIVITY AND 
GENEROSITY IN A CONNECTED AGE 175 (2010). 
224 See Grimmelman, supra note 218, at 1144. 
225 Participation in social networks is the most popular activity on the Internet. See 
What Americans Do Online: Social Media and Games Dominate Activity, NIELSON (Aug. 2, 
2010), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2010/what-americans-do-online-
social-media-and-games-dominate-activity.html [https://perma.cc/M65G-2XVR]. 
226 See RAINIE & WELLMAN, supra note 158, at 18; De Notaris, supra note 216. 
Application for mobile devices enables constant availability. There are also applications 
that form social networks aimed only for mobile devices, such as “WhatsApp.” However, 
in this case, the intermediary’s roles are different; they function as mere passive conduits, 
and their liability is beyond this Article’s scope. 
2016] CONTENT PROVIDERS’ SECONDARY LIABILITY 907 
 
previous Sections, I will evaluate the similarity, duration, and mul-
tiplexity factors in deliberation communities. 
With the similarity factor, participants gather around specific 
topics, or particular individuals and social groups. They connect 
together and share common denominators. Consequently, homo-
geneity of users is likely to exist in this format. 
With the duration factor, conversation is characterized by con-
stant and repeat players. In most forums, registration is a condition 
for participation and this allows the identification of repeat players 
and facilitates ongoing conversations. As for blogs, the blogger is a 
repeat player and in most cases, a network of commentators forms 
around his posts, sorting into identifiable communities. Social net-
work platforms allow individuals to construct a personal profile 
within the system. In most cases, this profile represents their real 
identity.227 Conversations are held by defined specific participants, 
apply to a particular audience and are characterized by repeat play-
ers. These characteristics enable bi-directional reciprocal commu-
nication and opportunities for repeat interaction. 
Regarding the multiplexity factor, the conversation’s topics are 
varied (personal, social, political, and cultural). Furthermore, con-
versations might expand to topics over time. In addition, similarity 
among participants and ongoing reciprocal conversation increase 
the likelihood for kinship and intimate discussions over the plat-
form. 
The special characteristics of this conversation platform allow 
the definition of collective goals and promote special aspect of free 
                                                                                                                            
227 Many social networks, including Facebook, require their users, within the terms of 
service, to construct a profile that reflects their real identity (“real name policy”) and use 
their “real” offline names when interacting within this realm. Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms [https://perma.cc/NT4L-
6TTP] (last visited Mar. 1, 2016) (“Facebook users provide their real names and 
information . . . . You will not provide any false personal information on 
Facebook . . . . The content provider has discretion to disable or delete profiles reflecting 
inaccurate personal information.”). For expansion on identity intermediaries, see Zarsky 
& Gomes de Andrade, supra note 58. 
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speech in advancing democratic culture. As a byproduct, it also in-
creases autonomy and promotes a free market of ideas.228 
Table I summarizes the different kinds of conversation plat-
forms in view of the strength of ties formed among their partici-
pants. 
Table I: Summary of Online Conversation Platforms & Strength of Ties 
The 
Strength 
of Ties 
Social Factors Affecting the Strength of Online Ties 
Examples 
The Conver-
sation Plat-
form Multiplexity Duration Similarity 
Weak 
ties at 
most 
)-(  )-(  )-(  *Talk-backs 
Comment sections in 
news sites 
 
The Boston Globe 
The Delfi web portal 
of Estonia 
 
*Bulletin boards 
Yahoo! Message board 
Freestyle 
General top-
ics 
Not diversi-
fied 
Not person-
al 
A large crowd of 
non-specific par-
ticipants. 
In most cases 
anonymous. 
It is hard to track 
repeat players. 
Speech is ex-
pressed ad hoc. 
Large and 
heteroge-
neous 
crowd of 
partici-
pants. 
Mostly 
week 
ties 
There 
might 
form 
interme-
diary ties 
at the 
“small 
world of 
repeat 
players. 
)-(  )-(+/  )-(  *Peer production 
projects consist of 
many small contribu-
tions of volunteers. 
Wikipedia 
 
*Platforms for co-
producing opinions 
and sharing knowledge 
Slashdot 
 
*User review sites and 
rating services. 
Yelp 
Peer 
Production 
The topic is 
focused on 
the peer 
production 
project 
It is not per-
sonal and 
not diversi-
fied. 
Ongoing interac-
tion might exist 
only among 
The “small 
world” of repeat 
players. 
Large and 
heteroge-
neous 
group of 
volunteer 
with di-
versified 
motiva-
tion 
                                                                                                                            
228 This conversation platform promotes extensive opportunities for political expression 
and reflects the participatory level of free expression whereas it develops the culture. It 
also reflects the individual’s autonomy, as reflected in every speech. This discourse 
enhances information flows, brings to the surface new information, and enriches the 
market of ideas. 
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The 
Strength 
of Ties 
Social Factors Affecting the Strength of Online Ties 
Examples 
The Conver-
sation Plat-
form Multiplexity Duration Similarity 
Likelih-
ood for 
Strong 
Ties 
(+) (+) (+) *Narrow Forums: 
Supportgroups+ 
 
*Blogs 
Daily Kos 
 
*Social Networks 
Facebook 
Twitter 
Deliberation 
and 
Constructing 
Communities 
Diversified 
topics that 
might be 
personal. 
Pseudonym or 
Real names. 
Specific audience. 
Bi-directional on-
going communica-
tion . 
Conversa-
tion 
Revolves 
around 
specific 
topic or 
specific 
individu-
als 
III. CONNECTED: TIES, CONTEXTS, AND CONTENT 
PROVIDERS’ LIABILITY TOWARDS A NEW MODEL 
“Context has always been part of the expression, because ex-
pression becomes meaningless if the context becomes arbi-
trary . . . . Meaning is only ever meaning in context.”229 
Speech over the Internet does not take place in a void, but ra-
ther in various contexts. Each context facilitates distinctive kinds of 
expressions, interactions, and activities among users.230 Differenc-
es among conversation platforms (“online social contexts”) influ-
ence speech. As I demonstrated above, the strength of ties implies 
on the scope of information diffusion and credibility. Based on the 
described taxonomy, I wish to propose a model of differential liabil-
ity regimes. This model would distinguish between conversation 
platforms and different group contexts. 
Studies proposed that courts should consider the online con-
text when referring to liability for online speech.231 However, they 
neither refer to the strength of ties nor do they outline clear distinc-
tions between online contexts.232 Their focus was not on content 
                                                                                                                            
229 JARON LANIER, YOU ARE NOT A GADGET 136 (2010). 
230 See Durkee, supra note 154, at 777. 
231 Jacob Rowbottom, To Rant, Vent and Converse: Protecting Low Level Digital Speech, 71 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 1, 18 (2012). 
232 See id. 
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providers’ liability.233 As far as I know, this is the first attempt to 
bind a descriptive social technological model, based on social con-
texts to normative legal structure. 
While resting on social online contexts as a central factor for 
determining content providers’ liability, we must also outweigh the 
nature of liability in every context. Liability is derived from several 
central factors related to balancing rights and interests at the base 
of speech torts. These factors depend on the social context formed 
in different conversation platforms. They are: (1) the gravity of 
harm; (2) private ordering (social norms that might mitigate or ex-
acerbate speech-related harms); and (3) the victim’s setting as in-
ternal or external to the conversation platform. Analysis reveals 
that different conversation platforms and different network settings 
embody different levels of harm. The likelihood for a successful 
private ordering also varies depending on these contexts. In addi-
tion, different aspects of freedom of expression are highlighted in 
different online contexts. 
Context-specific regulatory regimes may provide courts a sim-
ple rule of thumb for defining content providers’ scope of liability. 
This regime also grants content providers and entrepreneurs more 
certainty, which would facilitate efficient risk management ex ante 
and fairness ex post facto. I shall review these factors (gravity of 
harm, private ordering, and the victim’s setting) in the following 
Sections. 
A. Gravity of Harm 
Defamation law already takes into account the gravity of harm. 
In determining the level of compensation, the law considers the 
nature and extent of publication, the degree of credibility recipients 
ascribe to it, and the parties’ (both of the speaker and victim) con-
duct.234 The conversation platform affects the social network’s 
context and the incorporation of these factors. 
                                                                                                                            
233 Id. at 19; see also CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS, supra note 100, at 1546 (noting that 
in the case of the Internet, words may take on a different interpretation because of the 
way people treat and react to bulletin boards); Durkee, supra note 154 (focusing on 
unmasking anonymous speakers). 
234 See COLLINS, supra note 89, at 21.4–.7. 
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First, conversation platform affects the nature of information it 
transmits. Alongside conversation platforms that facilitate searches 
for impersonal stand-alone information, other platforms allow 
transmitting complex detailed information. As conversation plat-
forms facilitate flows of complex detailed information, greater 
harm might occur. Second, different conversation platforms affect 
information flows in varied ways. Conversation platforms’ context 
formulates the social structures and the composition of participants 
in the social network. It also affects the characteristics of the au-
dience (constant and particular or occasional) and the extent of 
publicity. Thus, conversation platforms might affect the likelihood 
of reaching the threshold for support and acceptance of speech and 
the choice to repeat it in a continuous chain of distribution. The 
more individuals evaluate information as credible and accept it, the 
greater the gravity of harm it might cause.235 Third, different con-
texts of conversation platforms affect the speaker’s reputation 
within the network and the degree of credence recipients ascribe to 
it. As shown, in conversation platforms characterized by occasional 
participants, acquiring reputation is not likely. However, there are 
platforms characterized by repeat players where speech originates 
from a reputable source and is more reliable than anonymous 
speech. Thus, conversation platforms, which allow one to acquire 
reputation, might cause more extensive harm. 
 I conclude that different contexts of conversation platforms in-
fluence the scope of speech-related harm. The importance of regu-
lating content providers’ liability increases whenever the gravity of 
harm is extensive. Understanding social contexts and distinguish-
ing between them allows a better recognition of circumstances 
                                                                                                                            
235 Conversation platforms, which allow the formation of strong ties, might lead to 
biases and informational and reputational cascades. These influences affect the likelihood 
of reaching thresholds for accepting the defamatory speech. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
CONSPIRACY THEORIES & OTHER DANGEROUS IDEAS 15–20 (2014); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 88–92 (2006) [hereinafter 
SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ON RUMORS: HOW FALSEHOODS SPREAD, 
WHY WE BELIEVE THEM, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE (2009) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, 
RUMORS]; Mark S. Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. SOC. 
1420, 1433 (1978). 
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when harm is made. It also outlines a rule of thumb for regulating 
content providers’ liability in these situations. 
B. Likelihood of Private Ordering 
Laws are not the most significant constraints on behavior. 
Alongside them, there are other regulating forces.236 As I have 
demonstrated above, traditional intermediaries have assumed 
codes of conduct on their own. The outlines norms are enforced in 
varied degrees of success.237 Private ordering and non-legal strate-
gies are more important online. In this Section, I focus on private 
ordering from the bottom up.238 This ordering is formed in a distri-
buted and transparent way among participants by social norms.239 
In an online platform, the participants composing a social net-
work commonly outline and enforce the social norms. This model 
was found to be effective in many contexts as attested in an impor-
tant body of scholarship. Many studies have explored settlements 
of cooperation and private ordering in communities regulated by 
reciprocal social norms.240 They found that coordinated ordering 
might emerge through social norms.241 Additionally, private order-
ing can be tailored specifically to the idiosyncratic needs and trans-
actional challenges of a particular context and can lead to improved 
                                                                                                                            
236 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 120–137 (2006); BROWN & MARSDEN, 
supra note 219, at 7 (addressing four main factors for regulating a behavior: laws, social 
norms, markets, and code); Tal Zarsky, Social Justice, Social Norms and the Governance of 
Social Media, 35 PACE L REV. 138, 155 (2015) (referring to four models of government in 
social media: code, contract, law, and social norms). 
237 See supra Section I.A. 
238 On the differences between “top-down” private ordering by code and terms of 
services and “bottom-up” private ordering by social norms and on the benefits and 
shortcomings of public and private ordering, see Zarsky, supra note 236. 
239 See Grimmelman, supra note 1 (referring to types of moderation: exclusion, price, 
organization, and norm setting). 
240 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES 167 (1991); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 74 (1990); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal 
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 
138 (1992). 
241 See supra note 240. 
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efficiency.242 Studies explain that actors are more willing to comply 
with norms they outline themselves rather than external rules.243 
Thus, in many contexts, private informal regulation has been prov-
en to be much more efficient than public ordering. 
As I outline a model for regulating content providers’ liability 
for speech torts, I wish to strike a proper balance between public 
and private ordering. One important guiding insight is that in some 
contexts, private ordering is sufficient, while in others, the law is 
required. Whenever efficient social norms apply within a conversa-
tion platform, formal public regulation is unnecessary.244 In these 
cases, formal regulation might even harm efficiency by “crowding 
out” intrinsic motivations for regulating interactions by social 
norms.245 However, when private regulation fails, formal public 
regulation should be required. 
The context of a conversation platform and the strength of ties 
are closely linked to the internal social structures that may promote 
private ordering. Private ordering varies among conversation plat-
forms. In some online contexts, social norms and the “wisdom of 
                                                                                                                            
242 Private ordering relies on reputation, which can induce members of a specific 
community to comply at a relatively low cost in comparison to public ordering. See Avery 
Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1758 (1996); Barak D. 
Richman, Essay: Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of 
Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2342 (2004). 
243 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE PENGUIN AND THE LEVIATHAN: HOW COOPERATION 
TRIUMPHS OVER SELF-INTEREST 179 (2011); Elinor Ostrom, James Walker & Roy 
Gardner, Covenants with and Without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible, 86 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 404, 413–14 (1992); Richard R. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination Theory 
and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being, 55 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 68, 69 (2000). Individuals tend to have an innate need for autonomy. They 
need to feel that they are in control of their own preferences. So, when they feel 
controlled by external rewards and punishment, their sense of autonomy may be 
threatened, and they tend to rebel by refusing to obey. In contrast, private ordering can 
preserve autonomy and bring more efficient obedience and enforcement at a low cost. 
244 See Ryan & Deci, supra note 243, at 71–73. 
245 The phenomenon of “crowding out” exists in particular when extrinsic incentives 
are enforced by sanctions, such as fines or punishments. However, this phenomenon also 
applies when the extrinsic motivation is positive, like in the case of rewards. See BENKLER, 
supra note 243, at 169, 173–74; SHIRKY, supra note 223, at 131–35; Edward L. Deci, 
Intrinsic Motivation, Extrinsic Reinforcement and Inequity, 22 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 113, 118–19 (1972); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J.L. 
STUD. 1, 15 (2000). 
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the crowd” allow efficient private ordering.246 However, in other 
platforms, social context might bring to informational and reputa-
tional cascades, exacerbate speech harms, and undermine efficient 
private ordering.247 
I shall explain the connection between the conversation plat-
form and the likelihood of private ordering in detail below, focusing 
on two central dimensions. First, social context influences the po-
tential to counter speech by victims and allow them to clear their 
names.248 Second, social context affects the participants’ composi-
tion and the social dynamics. I will demonstrate that some dynam-
ics can mitigate speech related harms when participants oppose the 
defaming speech and correct it. In contrast, other social dynamics 
may validate the defaming speech and exacerbate speech related 
harms. 
C. Internal and External Victims 
In addition to the gravity of harm and likelihood of private or-
dering, I shall distinguish between two kinds of victims: the internal 
victim, a community member who chose to take part in a conversa-
tion and was defamed while interacting with other participants; and 
the external victim, an individual outside the social network, who 
was defamed in a conversation he did not take part in.249 
                                                                                                                            
246 See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER 
THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMICS, 
SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS 22 (2005). 
247 Informational cascades are formed when individuals follow the statements or actions 
of predecessors and do not express their opposing opinions because they believe their 
predecessors are right. As a result, the social network does not obtain important 
information. Reputational cascades are formed because of social pressures. In these cases, 
people think they know what is right, or what is likely to be right, but they nonetheless go 
along with the crowd in order to maintain their status. See Cass R. Sunstein & Reid 
Hastie, Four Failures of Deliberating Groups (Univ. of Chi. Law School, Working Paper 
No. 215, 2008). 
248 The idea of counter speech was established in the case of New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270. See also RICHARDS, supra note 82, at 37–39; Robert D. 
Richards & Clay Calvert, Counterspeech 2000: A New Look at the Old Remedy for “Bad” 
Speech, B.Y.U. L. REV. 553, 553–55 (2000). 
249 For similar distinctions between inner and outer environments, see Tal Zarsky, Law 
and Online Social Networks: Mapping the Challenges and Promises of User-Generated 
Information Flows, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 741, 774 (2008). 
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The victim’s social setting, whether it is external or internal, af-
fects the gravity of harm. Therefore, the setting should be taken 
into account when a model for content providers’ liability is formu-
lated. The severity of harm of an internal victim is lower than the 
external. An internal user might enjoy the protection of private or-
dering, unlike the external user, since he is an outsider to the social 
dynamic of the group. As a result, in this case, public regulation 
might be required. 
An internal victim has participated in the conversation. There-
fore, he can counter the defamatory speech immediately after its 
publication, thus restoring his image. He is aware of the social 
norms of conversation, so he can conduct an efficient self-risk 
management assessment regarding whether he wants to take part in 
a particular conversation. He can also decide to quit the conversa-
tion platform. Or, he can attempt to change and improve his social 
standing within the community.250 In contrast, an external victim 
would probably find out about the defamatory utterance long after 
publication. As a result, he would not have a fair opportunity to re-
spond.251 In many conversation platforms, participants do not have 
to use their real names.252 Therefore, internal actors can control 
their exposure to risk by using pseudonyms.253 External victim, 
however, cannot control the level of exposure to potential damage 
to his reputation, which might extend beyond the specific conver-
sation realm. 
The likelihood for private ordering is also linked to the victim’s 
setting; interpersonal and group dynamics might enhance regula-
tion. Members of the community might publish rules regarding be-
                                                                                                                            
250 See ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES 15 (1972). In organizations and communities, 
members respond by exiting when the organization demonstrates a decrease in quality 
(withdrawing from the relationship), or, alternatively, they improve the relationship 
through communicating a complaint. 
251 Delayed counter speech might not mitigate harm and can fail to restore the victim’s 
reputation efficiently. 
252 Online social networks are usually an exception to this rule. See supra note 227. 
253 Whenever internal actors use pseudonyms, the extent of harm is limited to the group 
context. Thus, even if the defamatory speech can be republished and diffused outside the 
specific group, it cannot be linked to his real name and identity offline. 
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havior, develop social norms, and enforce them to the benefit of 
internal users. Other participants might sanction participants who 
harm the community and infringe communal culture and norms.254 
Thus, group contexts lead to self-governance and have a restraining 
effect. In contrast, the external victim does not belong to the com-
munity and the restraining social norms described above do not ap-
ply to him. In some contexts, social interactions within a communi-
ty might have an adverse effect and even exacerbate his harm.255 
This analysis leads to the following conclusion: whenever the 
severity of harm is low and there is a substantial likelihood for pri-
vate ordering, formal regulations are unnecessary. Whenever dis-
cussions in a platform lead to severe harm alongside substantial li-
kelihood for private ordering, it must be examined whether the 
harm can be mitigated in this fashion. One should take into account 
whether the victim was internal or external to the setting. In online 
contexts, which lead to successful private ordering, formal regula-
tion is redundant. 
D. Severity of Harm and Private Ordering in Light of Different 
Conversation Platforms 
1. Freestyle Conversation 
Freestyle conversation platform is characterized by weak ties; 
thus, the potential of harm is low. The information diffused in this 
realm is composed of small, stand-alone items, and it does not faci-
litate the diffusion of in-depth personal information. In contrast to 
peer-production platforms, this platform does not integrate infor-
                                                                                                                            
254 These participants might experience gatekeeping. See Karine Barzilai-Nahon, 
Gatekeeping in Virtual Communities: On Politics of Power in Cyberspace, 6 HICSS-39 135 
(2006). 
255 Group identity motivates participants to identify and sacrifice their interests in favor 
of the group. However, there is a flip side; solidarity usually results in a mentality of “us” 
against “them.” Group members treat themselves differently than they treat outsiders. 
Solidarity among group members might lead to indifference towards others, xenophobia, 
and intolerance of strangers. Thus, a coherent group might unite against the external 
individual. See BENKLER, supra note 243, at 89–95; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO 
EXTREMES: HOW LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE 103–07 (2009); Samuel Bowels & 
Herbert Gintis, Persistent Parochialism: Trust and Exclusion in Ethnic Networks, 55 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 1, 2 (2004). 
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mation from different sources. The audience is non-specific; speech 
is not directed at defined recipients; and the platform forms a junc-
ture for information diffusion. If a conversation is held anonymous-
ly, it might be impossible to identify participants. Heterogeneity of 
participants is also very likely. Even when participants use their real 
identity (when the content provider integrates social media plugins 
in the platform),256 conversation is still conducted ad hoc, and the 
audience is non-specific. Thus, it is unlikely that the participants will 
create a reputation for themselves.257 
Information is disseminated to a large audience; however, par-
ticipants are independent with no discernable hierarchy. Thus, it is 
unlikely that participants would organize an attack on a single vic-
tim. Since numerous comments are expressed in a short period of 
time, a specific comment is generally followed by many others. As a 
result, a specific defamatory comment is less public, and it is im-
probable that significant number of readers will access it.258 The 
seriousness of a specific defamatory expression in this context is 
weak.259 Moreover, in the absence of ongoing discussions and in 
light of the spontaneity and immediacy of speech, in-depth conver-
sations are not held. Therefore, statements made within this con-
versation are not considered credible, they do not leave any real im-
pression, and Internet users consider them insignificant.260 
                                                                                                                            
256 In Section II.D.1, I discussed social plugins that enable participants to express 
freestyle comments using their social network profile. See supra note 180 and 
accompanying text. 
257 Commentators via social plugin build certain reputations when they interact in a 
social network platform. However, this reputation does not follow them to the freestyle 
conversation platform. Celebrities might be an exception because their general reputation 
follows them everywhere. 
258 See Tamiz v. Google, Inc. [2013] EWCA (Civ) 68 [50] (Eng.). 
259 Rowbottom, supra note 188, at 373 (noting that the focus should be directed at the 
audience of the platform, and also on the attention the comment will gain because 
multiplicity of comments obscures the attention to a specific defamatory comment and 
diminishes the gravity of harm). 
260 See Karniel, supra note 178, at 233 (stating that talkbacks and chat rooms on the 
Internet do not leave any real impression); Shalev, supra note 189; see also Magyar 
Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, App. No. 22947/13, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 135 (2016): “For the Court, the expressions used in the comments, albeit 
belonging to a low register of style, are common in communication on many Internet 
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The possibility of causing harm in freestyle online conversation 
is marginal even to an external victim, whose identity is known, due 
to the superficial format, and low credibility ascribed to it. In addi-
tion, multiplicity of comments obscures the prominence of a specif-
ic defamatory comment. 
The same goes to the internal victim, who takes part in the con-
versation (usually anonymously) and is offended by speech di-
rected at him (for example, “to commentator 59”). The victim 
controls his online persona and can respond anonymously. The 
speech is not linked to his identity offline, and harm is usually li-
mited to momentary discomfort. Even when participants use social 
plugins, commenting via social network profiles that reveal their 
real identity, they control their statements and can delete them af-
ter the fact to reduce harm.261 
Private ordering can repair the minor harm mentioned above. In 
these conversation formats, the victim can respond and mitigate 
the damage. The internal victim can respond immediately, correct 
the impressions formed by the defamatory statement, and clear his 
name.262 In the absence of strong ties, this conversation format is 
characterized by a wide range of heterogeneous ideas which might 
serve as a counterweight for the defamatory speech by correcting 
it. Thus, readers would be exposed to diverse opinions. The exter-
nal victim can also counter the defamatory statement if he learns 
about it soon after publication. 
The attributes of this conversation format diminish concerns to 
severe violation of autonomy; defamatory statements should not 
lead to suppression of speech. Although speech in this format does 
not leave behind it significant impression, it has positive aspects in 
promoting the autonomy of the speakers and self-fulfillment. The 
minor harms and the likelihood for private ordering regarding both 
                                                                                                                            
portals – a consideration that reduces the impact that can be attributed to those 
expressions.” Id. at para. 77. 
261 In such cases, after the victim deleted his speech, although the defaming speech 
remains in conversation, it is detached from the full context and is considered 
meaningless. 
262 For the efficiency of the counter-speech doctrine, explaining that “bad speech” can 
be effectively countered or cured with more speech, see Richards & Calvert, supra note 
248. 
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internal and external victims lead to the conclusion that the law 
should exempt content providers from liability for users’ defamato-
ry statements in this conversation format. 
Exempting content providers from liability fits well with the 
normative considerations for liability and reflects a proper bal-
ance.263 Alternative liability standards that were discussed above264 
do not lead to optimal balance among normative considerations. 
They would lead content providers to remove socially beneficial 
speech from their platform even though the harm is minor at most. 
The outcome would cause a chilling effect, injustice, and ineffi-
ciency.265 In view of this, exempting content providers reflects the 
optimal balance in this conversation platform. 
2. Peer Production 
In this conversation platform, the majority of participants are 
not repeat players, and weak ties connect them. However, at the 
core of this platform, “small worlds” might form, and in this par-
ticular clustering, intermediary ties might exist.266 This conversa-
tion platform embodies extensive severity of harm. The unique 
platform facilitates aggregation and integration of information from 
different sources and enables the dissemination of complex in-depth 
information. 
The audience is extensive, even though the speech is not re-
ferred to specific recipients; however, discussions among the core 
                                                                                                                            
263 First, in light of the minor harm of this conversation platform, an exemption for 
content providers reflects the proper balance between the speaker’s right to free speech 
and the victim’s rights for speech and dignity, while enhancing autonomy and self-
fulfillment. Second, an exemption for content providers of this conversation platform is 
justified by corrective justice because content providers do not cause speech-related 
harms themselves. In addition, the operation of platforms is just a background risk. Third, 
economic considerations also justify exempting content providers’ liability in this 
conversation platform in light of the minor harm and the high prevention costs that 
exceed their benefits; deterrence through liability is inefficient. Innovation considerations 
justify exemption from liability and avoid hampering technological developments. 
264 See supra Section I.E (discussing alternative liability regimes: notice-and-takedown, 
negligence, and strict liability). 
265 See supra Section I.E (noting that other liability regimes cause over-deterrence and 
result in the removal of non-defamatory beneficial content). 
266 For an explanation of the small world phenomenon, see supra Section I.D.2. 
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participants are bi-directional and refer to specific members. In this 
platform, discussions are not ad hoc but are held in unique envi-
ronments for peer-production projects. Despite the absence of 
strong ties among participants, statements made in these conversa-
tion platforms are considered credible.267 This outcome is partly 
due to the technical interfaces. The architecture enables writing 
entries or submitting reviews on specific topics, the integration of 
contributions, and online feedback mechanisms affect the weight 
ascribed to statements in this conversation platform. This might 
lead to extensive harm for external and internal victims. 
Although most participants aspire to contribute in peer-
production projects and add credible information, some of them 
prefer their self-interest to the project’s success and publish false 
defamatory statements. As to an external victim, the aggregation of 
information from many sources to a consolidated output that spe-
cifically refers to an identified victim can cause extensive harm. As 
studies emphasize, rating and review websites can have a big im-
pact on the success—or failure—of a business.268 Thus, negative 
reviews about a specific business on a rating and review website are 
likely to bring customers to avoid its services, and this results in 
loss of economic opportunities. However, participants of this con-
versation platform are heterogeneous, each user acts independently 
from the other,269 thus creating a diverse “market of ideas.”270 As 
                                                                                                                            
267 Statements expressed in peer-production conversation are perceived credible. For 
instance, the journal Nature reviewed Wikipedia and found it was as accurate as the 
encyclopedia Britannica. See supra note 198. Review websites and rating services were 
also found credible. For example, Professor Lior Strahilevitz introduced findings, which 
showed that quality control often elicits helpful and reasonably accurate feedback. 
Professors’ feedbacks correlate with scores on in-class student evaluations of teaching 
performance. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Pseudonymous Litigation, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1239, 1247–50 (2010). 
268 See ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE 118 
(2014); Michael Luca, Reviews, Reputation, and Revenue: The Case of Yelp.com (Harv. Bus. 
Sch., Working Paper No. 12-016, 2011). The number of stars a restaurant has on its Yelp 
profile closely correlates to the amount of business it receives. Consumers’ reviews thus 
present a new way of disseminating information over the Internet, and they are becoming 
a substitute for traditional forms of reputation building. 
269 Heterogeneity and the independence of speakers are kept in spite of the potential for 
intermediary ties among the core repeat players. In contrast to conversation platforms 
that facilitate strong ties, the peer-production platform is not characterized by 
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a result, the likelihood that the participants unite against one victim 
decreases. 
Offensive defamatory statements might harm an internal victim 
in peer production projects. In some cases, participants even attack 
others personally and violate the platform’s policy and terms of 
service.271 However, most participants usually use pseudonyms and 
separate themselves from their real identity. Thus, the gravity of 
harm is limited to the internal setting.272 Discussions on the peer-
production project are neither personal nor multiplex. Further-
more, in light of the participants’ heterogeneity, the likelihood that 
many participants unite against one victim decreases in this setting. 
Nevertheless, internal victims might bear emotional harm, and 
their reputation might be damaged within the community, although 
the gravity of harm is lower than the external victim’s harms. 
In this conversation platform, social forces facilitate private or-
dering. These forces mitigate harm and support the exemption of 
content providers from liability. In the absence of strong ties, peer-
production conversation platforms contain a variety of ideas. In 
addition, technical interfaces within platforms (feedback and rating 
mechanisms), promote private ordering via “wisdom of the 
                                                                                                                            
homogeneity or personal discussions. It focuses on the peer-production project and the 
topic at hand. It is not characterized by multiplexity. Therefore, strong ties will not form 
even among the core repeat players. Intermediary ties are different from strong ones and 
will not exacerbate the gravity of harm. See generally Strahilevitz, supra note 160. 
270 See, e.g., Reit v. Yelp!, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 411, 412–13 (Sup. Ct. 2010). In this case, a 
dentist’s business Yelp page included favorable reviews alongside negative reviews. Id. 
271 In many peer-production platforms, content providers restrict their participants’ 
behavior. See Terms of Service, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/static?p=tos&country=US 
[https://perma.cc/XDM6-G5KL] (last visited Mar. 2, 2016) (“You agree not to, and will 
not assist, encourage, or enable others to use the Site to . . . . Threaten, stalk, harm, or 
harass others, or promote bigotry or discrimination.”); Policies and Guidelines, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Policies_and_guidelines [https://perma.cc/5R
AC-KG2Z] (last visited Mar. 2, 2016). 
272 To the extent that participants link their online identity with their real one (for 
instance, in cases when participants connect themselves to their real identity by 
registering to the peer-production platform via their real names), they choose to expose 
themselves to defamation risks. Furthermore, the risk of harm in this conversation realm 
is limited in view of heterogeneity and the focus on the peer-production project. The 
absence of strong ties implicates the gravity of harm. 
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crowd,”273 and allow efficient judgment of quality, trustworthiness, 
and relevance of content. In addition, the absence of strong ties re-
duces the likelihood of social pressures among participants. Thus, 
independence and diversity are maintained. 
Private ordering mitigates the internal victim’s harms. Hetero-
geneity and independence of participants enable equal opportunity 
for a victim to counter defamatory speech. Furthermore, the par-
ticipant’s commitment to the project incentivizes them to take part 
in private ordering and correct mistakes. Intermediary ties among 
members of the core of repeat players might facilitate a reciprocity 
dynamic, social monitoring, and enforcement. These dynamics en-
hance the potential of private ordering.274 
Private ordering is also sufficient for protecting the interests of 
external victims. Although this type of victim cannot respond with 
counter speech in real time, social forces within this conversation 
platform mitigate the harm. More than a decade ago, a famous 
software engineer proposed: “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are 
shallow.”275 Analogically, in the absence of strong ties and in view 
of the platform’s attributes, participants would correct errors in 
order to improve the peer-production project and outputs. They 
might even bring to the removal of defamatory statements on plat-
forms.276 I shall illustrate below how some technological and socio-
logical mechanisms improve social ordering of external and internal 
victims. To do so, I will refer to popular content providers of this 
conversation platform: Wikipedia and Yelp. 
Wikipedia created its own policies, enforcement schemes, and 
norms,277 and well-functioning core members enforce social 
                                                                                                                            
273 See SUROWIECKI, supra note 246 (referring to four characteristics that make a group 
smart: diversity, independence, decentralization, and coordination). 
274 See Elinor Ostrom, Toward a Behavioral Theory Linking Trust, Reciprocity and 
Reputation, in TRUST & RECIPROCITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY LESSONS FOR EXPERIMENTAL 
RESEARCH 19, 41 (Elinor Ostrom & James Walker eds., 2005). 
275 ERIC S. RAIMOND, THE CATHEDRAL & THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN 
SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 19 (2001). 
276 In some platforms, participants might bring the removal of harmful content by 
flagging it as offensive. See supra note 153. 
277 See Zittrain, supra note 198, at 144. 
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norms.278 Private ordering mechanisms diminish the likelihood of 
severe harm for the internal victim. Participants can represent their 
controversial views on discussion pages. They can report impolite, 
uncivil, or other difficult communications on special notice 
boards.279 Moreover, Wikipedia has an official dispute-resolution 
system starting with talking to one another and commenting, fol-
lowing by mediation and ending with an arbitration committee.280 
This committee can sanction participants who do not operate ac-
cording to the norms and guidelines and may even ban members of 
the community who make life unpleasant for their fellow users and 
behave in an anti-social manner.281 Technology facilitates enforce-
ment and enables a ban of participants from editing certain articles 
or totally blocking their IP addresses. Enforcement mechanisms 
also diminish the likelihood of defamation or misinformation for 
external victims. Reciprocal monitoring within the vast community 
enables the publication of neutral undistorted entries that improve 
the project. In general, private ordering mechanisms on Wikipedia 
are efficient.282 
                                                                                                                            
278 Wiki tools do not govern themselves according to official private ordering process, 
but the social norms of the core repeat player and the peers’ obligation to the project keep 
users in line. A Wikitorial experiment conducted by the Los Angeles Times failed even 
though it used similar Wiki tools. In this experiment, the conversation was “freestyle.” 
See Grimmelman, supra note 1, at 87. 
279 David A. Hoffman & Salil K. Mehra, Wikitruth: Through Wikiorder, 59 EMORY L.J. 
151, 173 (2010) (detailing the guiding principles of Wikipedia). 
280 This system performs two different functions simultaneously. First, it removes those 
who would destroy Wikipedia through their failure to abide by its norms. Second, it 
provides guidance to those who value Wikipedia as a community, but disagree as to 
proper conduct, so that they can coordinate their behavior within a common framework 
of norms and rules. See id. at 175. 
281 See id. at 194. Wikipedia is a divide between substance and process. It ascribes great 
severity for anti-social behavior more than violations of editing policies. The severe 
sanctions are reserved for anti-social behavior. As for the content, Wikipedia commonly 
trusts participants to correct mistakes. Thus, the sanctions for policy violations are 
usually less radical. Id. 
282 In cases where defamatory speech remains uncorrected, it is probably due to the fact 
that few people take notice of it. Thus, in these cases, harm is insignificant. For instance, 
a prankster had made an edit to the Wikipedia article about journalist John Seigenthaler, 
suggesting that he had been involved in the assassinations of John F. Kennedy. The 
statement is false but did not appear as vandalism. The article sat unchanged for four 
months until a friend alerted Seigenthaler to it. The defamatory expression would have 
been corrected if more people took notice of it. See Zittrain, supra note 198, at 138. 
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In rating websites and review services, the environment is less 
charged than it is on Wikipedia.283 Every participant can contest a 
review by writing a new review, describing a different experience. 
He can also use the option to “talk” and open a conversation about 
a particular review.284 The heterogeneity and independence of par-
ticipants allow the successful use of counter speech. Moreover, 
participants can report offensive comments and the content pro-
vider may remove them. 
In review websites, the rights of an external victim are pro-
tected by private ordering, and wisdom of the crowd mitigates 
harm. Diversified reviews are aggregated in one platform and allow 
a balanced market of ideas. Moreover, heterogeneity of participants 
enables efficient feedback by voting and reputation mechanisms.285 
These private ordering schemes enable the website’s users to esti-
mate a review’s credibility. The option to start “talks” also plays 
an important role in the external context. Participants can refer to 
particular reviews, express their opinion regarding their fairness 
and counter speech. 
I conclude that in this conversation platform, social forces and 
the platform’s ability to aggregate diverse expressions facilitate a 
balanced conversation. They also promote efficient private order-
ing for both internal and external victims. In most cases, private 
ordering is an efficient method that can mitigate speech tort’s 
harms. The law, therefore, should exempt content providers from 
liability to speech related harms for both types of victims in this 
conversation platform. An exemption from liability would promote 
an efficient market of ideas and bring to optimal exercise of the 
right to freedom of speech in this conversation platform. This con-
clusion remains true even when there are only few participants. 
                                                                                                                            
283 In contrast to Wikipedia mechanisms, review website and rating services do not 
enable participants to edit other participants’ reviews. Thus, the likelihood for extensive 
disputes is relatively low. Additionally, in light of this platform’s architecture, reviews 
cannot be vandalized, as opposed to vandalism of entries in Wikipedia. 
284 See Talk, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/talk [https://perma.cc/DY2X-JN2K] (last 
visited May 22, 2016). 
285 The platform notes the number of reviews every participant wrote and the 
participants who trusts him. In addition, voting mechanisms facilitate efficient feedback 
by participants. 
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One might argue that in an environment with few users, private 
ordering might not be sufficient. However, few opinions do not re-
duce the efficacy of private ordering.286 Liability rules that exempt 
content providers are superior to other liability regimes. In this 
conversation platform, other liability regimes, such as notice-and-
takedown, negligence, and strict liability, are far from ideal and ne-
gatively affect the quality of information products, undermining the 
purpose of these types of platforms. Hence, in this online context, 
exempting content providers from liability is the best alternative to 
other liability regimes.287 This conclusion is in line with the dis-
cussed normative considerations.288 
3. Deliberation and Structuring Communities 
In this conversation platform, the gravity of harm is extensive 
in light of the strong ties formed between participants. This con-
versation platform facilitates in-depth discussions and enables the 
dissemination of complex information. The participants are repeat 
players who deliberate among themselves. The audience characte-
rized by homogeneity and their opinions are likely to be uniform.289 
                                                                                                                            
286 The fact that only few people participate does not undermine heterogeneity of 
participants and balanced responses. Additionally, when there are only few participants, 
the reliance on the information published material also decreases and the gravity of harm 
is relatively low. For instance, one uncorrected review affects less than many uncorrected 
reviews. Moreover, the fact that there are only few reviews might indicate that only few 
people use the website. Thus, the defamatory speech has less exposure. 
287 Imposing liability on content providers would cause the removal of expressions from 
the platforms even if they are not defamatory. Content providers cannot determine 
whether expressions are true or false and whether they fall under defamation laws. Since 
they would like to limit their exposure to liability, content providers would take 
precautionary actions and remove expressions. This results in over-deterrence. 
288 See supra Section I.D. Exemption of content providers from liability makes an ideal 
balance between free speech and dignity in this conversation realm. Exemption would 
reduce a possible chilling effect; the likelihood for private ordering mitigates harm to an 
individual’s dignity and reputation. Hence, the exemption of liability balances 
constitutional considerations properly. Exemption of liability fits well with conservative 
theories of tort law. Content providers do not cause the defamatory expression. In light of 
private ordering, cost-benefit analysis also justifies exemption. This outcome will also 
promote innovation and development of advanced peer-production platforms without 
being concerned of liability. Id. 
289 See SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 235, at 9 (describing homogenous 
communities as “echo chambers” and self-reinforcing “information cocoons”). This 
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Consequently, continuing mass attacks directed at specific individ-
uals is probable. The strength of ties and hierarchy among commu-
nity members increases social pressure, and group dynamics might 
lead to extremism.290 These dynamics intensify the scope of defa-
matory speech and amplify the gravity of harm.291 In addition, 
statements made in this conversation platform are considered cred-
ible. Strong ties among participants and continuing conversations 
among repeat players that gain personal reputation increase an ex-
pression’s credibility relatively to anonymous interactions.292 
These characteristics lead to severe harm for specific individuals. 
The potential harm to an internal victim because of violations 
of proper conversation norms is extensive. Even if we ignore the 
potential of mass attacks against a specific individual, the internal 
victim’s emotional harm is more extensive than in other conversa-
tion platforms. The reasons are the strength of ties and the au-
dience of the defamatory statements.293 In this conversation plat-
form, most participants are repeat players. Defamation harm might 
be continuous, ruin the internal victim’s reputation, and under-
mine his status within the community. However, in light of his abil-
ity to control his online reflection and identity, he can represent 
himself by a pseudonym before joining the platform. Thus, he can 
limit his harm only to the internal context. The ability to refrain 
from using one’s real identity is an important policy consideration 
for not imposing liability on content providers when the victim 
                                                                                                                            
reciprocal reinforcement among community members facilitates powerful attacks, and the 
group’s identity reduces self-awareness and self-control. See Tom Postmes & Russel 
Spears, Deindividuation and Antinormative Behavior: A Meta-Analysis, 123 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
238, 254 (1998). Evidence of uniformity and homogeneity in this conversation realm were 
also found lately. For instance, mapping conversations in online social networks led to the 
conclusion that social networks lead to self-enforcement and polarization. See Gilad 
Lotan, Israel, Gaza, War & Data, MEDIUM (Aug. 4, 2014), https://medium.com/i-
data/israel-gaza-war-data-a54969aeb23e [https://perma.cc/M2SB-7WXR]. 
290 See SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 235, at 88–92; SUNSTEIN, RUMORS, supra note 
235, at 21–27. 
291 See Grimmelman, supra note 218, at 1177. 
292 See Strahilevitz, supra note 161, at 964. 
293 In conversation platforms that promote deliberation and communities, the audience 
of a defaming speech directed at an internal victim is composed of participants of his own 
virtual community. Because of the social ties between the victim and his surroundings, 
the gravity of harm is more extensive. 
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chose to reveal his real identity. In other words, one may argue that 
the victim has consented to the risk of harm, and there is a volunta-
ry assumption of risk.294 
An exception to this rule is social networks, where the practice 
is that participants reflect their real identity. Some social networks, 
such as Facebook, require registration and identifying in real 
names.295 One may argue that in these cases an alternative balance 
is required. However, a closer look shows this is not the case. 
When the rule is that participants reveal their real identity―the 
victim would be able to file a suit against the speaker who is directly 
responsible to harm and the justifications to content providers’ lia-
bility weakens. The victim can be compensated, and the speaker 
could remove the defamatory speech, whereas in social networks, 
the participants themselves can delete their statements after the 
fact.296 Additionally, the victim can report to the content provider 
about the violation of terms of service whenever an individual do 
not reveal his real identity. In response, the content provider might 
remove the speaker’s profile.297 
                                                                                                                            
294 See James Fleming, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185, 196 
(1968). This defense is limited in scope and will not apply to a bilateral level, in a suit 
between the victim and the speaker. Nevertheless, I think this principle should be applied 
in the context of third-party liability. 
At this point, one can argue that considering the victim’s ability to control his online 
persona as part of a model for legal liability conveys a normative message that it is 
inappropriate for individuals to reveal themselves and reflect their real identity online. 
The result of depriving remedies from these victims may encourage anonymity online. 
However, despite this outcome, I think that the principle of voluntary assumption of risk 
is appropriate. Anonymity has many positive implications. It enables participants to 
mitigate their risks and protect themselves in many contexts. Additionally, it facilitates 
self-disclosure. Concealing one’s real identity does not necessarily harm civilized dialogs. 
In these cases participants are repeat players and the reputation of their pseudonym is 
important to them. Hence, it is likely that they fit in to acceptable social norms. 
295 This practice is called “real names policy.” See supra note 227. 
296 In this context, I reviewed the legal regime in England, where the liability of content 
providers is residual. See supra Section I.C.2.a. I do not believe that a residual liability 
regime is ideal in every online context particularly because the content provider can 
remove the defamatory content, whereas the main remedy from the speaker is 
compensation. However, in the context of social networks this regime might be 
appropriate especially in light of the speaker’s technical ability to delete his statements 
after the fact. 
297 See Zarsky, supra note 58, at 1337 (referring to the possibility of removing or blocking 
profiles that do not reflect a real identity). See, e.g., This Woman Changed Her Name Just 
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The damage to the external victim is more extensive than the 
internal one. Strong ties among participants and their homogeneity 
affects the social dynamic of the group. It leads to solidarity within 
the group; yet, there is a flip side. It may lead to indifference to-
wards outsiders, xenophobia, and intolerance.298 As a result, it is 
more likely that participants will unite against external victims.299 
Thus, falsehoods may become conventional wisdom and cause se-
vere harm. Unfortunately, this has occurred more than a few 
times.300 
Nevertheless, it would be an oversight to conclude the discus-
sion at this point. In this conversation platform, the likelihood for 
strong ties among participants is high. Strong ties form homogen-
ous social structures that produce cohesion among participants. In 
this conversation platform, private ordering is extremely impor-
tant. Private ordering can mitigate the damage and should affect 
the preferred liability policy. However, in this online platform, 
there is a gap in the manner external and internal victims are 
treated. As will be shown in the following Sections, the efficacy of 
clearing one’s name depends on the social status of the user. 
Users in internal settings appreciate the strong ties with other 
participants; they form homogenous social structures, which sup-
port continuing relationships and closeness. These structures pro-
mote empathy, solidarity, and considerable willingness to coope-
rate.301 Strong ties between participants lead to social norms of re-
ciprocity and trust. These norms preserve social control; and as a 
                                                                                                                            
So She Could Log in to Facebook, TIME (July 13, 2015), http://time.com/3955056/
facebook-social-media-jemma-rogers-uk/ [https://perma.cc/QUQ3-84C4]. 
298 For an explanation of the implications of a group’s identity, see supra note 255. 
299 See, e.g., Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 NLRB No. 37 (Dec. 14, 2012). A 
woman posted a status on her Facebook page criticizing a colleague’s comment regarding 
her treatment of clients. Id. at *1. She called her fellow co-workers to comment, and four 
employees responded by posting messages objecting to the idea that their work 
performance was deficient and attacked the colleague that made the statement. Id. 
300 See Boston v. Atheran, 329 Ga. App. 890, 890 (2014). On external victim’s speech 
related harm, see CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 2. Defamatory posts 
usually spread among like-minded participants. They can also cause defamatory 
comments, which support the original post, and exacerbate the external victim’s harm. 
301 See BENKLER, supra note 243, at 89–92. The homogeneity and solidarity sustain 
cooperation. 
2016] CONTENT PROVIDERS’ SECONDARY LIABILITY 929 
 
result, they are normally more efficient than public formal order-
ing.302 In most cases, community members conform to the shared 
values and social norms. They follow their own internal code, and 
they strive to achieve common goals.303 In addition, they also fear 
social sanctions.304 The internal victim is an integral part of the 
community. Being aware of the social norms of the conversation, 
he should decide accordingly whether he wants to take part in the 
conversation, in his attempt to clear his name. Or, he may opt to 
withdraw from the conversation and limit his damage.305 
The external victim, in contrast, is disadvantaged by the social 
context, which increases the chances for unsuccessful private or-
dering. The participants may not remedy the damage, but might 
exacerbate it. Strong ties create group identity and an isolated 
community suspicious of outsiders. This context leads to polariza-
tion and enhances social pressures.306 It increases the likelihood 
that participants unite against the external victim.307 The likelihood 
for balancing comments to counter the defamatory speech is low. 
Consequently, the impression of the defamatory comments shall 
remain unilaterally negative. The likelihood for an external victim 
to clear his name by countering the defaming speech is negligible, 
since the victim is not part of the conversation. Even if the defama-
tory comment becomes immediately known to the victim, the so-
cial dynamic of the group limits his ability to counter the speech 
                                                                                                                            
302 A large body of scholarship describes efficient private ordering and successful 
mechanisms for dispute resolution optimally adjusted to the needs of the group. The 
strength of ties actually isolates the group from other communities and allows an efficient 
self-government. Social norms allow private ordering and wealth maximization. See 
Ostrom, Walker & Gardner, supra note 243. 
303 See BENKLER, supra note 243, at 20. 
304 The members of the community function as gatekeepers. They cope with internal 
offenders who infringe communal culture successfully. See Barzilai-Nahon, supra note 
254, at 6. 
305 See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 250; SUNSTEIN, supra note 255, at 44. 
306 Studies suggest that group polarization is more likely and is heightened when people 
have a sense of shared identity and belong to a tight-knit group or a club. Shared identities 
can be a breeding ground for both confidence and extremism. See SUNSTEIN & HASTIE, 
supra note 195, at 85–86. 
307 See BENKLER, supra note 243, at 92–95; SUNSTEIN, supra note 255, at 107. 
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efficiently.308 As a result, private ordering in this setting is inade-
quate.309 
I have reached the conclusion that participants’ social norms 
and internal social sanctions mitigate the risks for uncontrolled 
harm to the internal victim. Thus, the potential for private ordering 
reduces speech-related damage. Additionally, the internal victim 
can control his online identity by using pseudonyms that would re-
duce the potential for harm. Alternative liability regimes might 
cause over-deterrence and result in a chilling effect. Top-down in-
tervention might affect the social structure of the group changing 
the motivations in this type of conversation platform, which might 
crowd out the intrinsic motivations to comply with social norms.310 
In order to preserve the incentive to private ordering, the law 
should exempt content providers from liability for the damage 
caused to internal victims. Especially since the victim holds the op-
tion to file a civil suit against the direct speaker.311 
The social context may increase the damage to the reputation 
of an external victim. Due to social dynamics and the failure of pri-
vate ordering, the law should not allow an overall exemption to 
content providers. Instead, the optimal liability regime in this on-
line setting is notice-and-takedown. This rule allows content pro-
viders to benefit from relative certainty. By removing defamatory 
                                                                                                                            
308 When a group is homogenous, it may hold a prejudice regarding the credibility of a 
corrective statement, which may in fact backfire, by increasing people’s commitment to 
original defamatory statement. See Edward Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Does More Speech 
Correct Falsehoods?, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 68 (2014). 
309 The participants unite against the victim, resulting in an imbalanced dissemination 
of information. For example, this private ordering limitation is reflected in hate group 
pages on Facebook. These groups spread falsehoods, inspire hate, and send powerful 
message to readers. In these cases, the external victim does not stand a chance to counter 
speech equally. See Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate 
Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1447–
48, 1450 (2011). 
310 In many cases, complying with social norms is derived from the community’s desire 
to preserve its independence. See Barzilai-Nahon, supra note 254, at 6. For expansion on 
crowding out, see supra note 245. 
311 If the victim proves his claims in court, the content provider will remove the 
defamatory speech according to the decision. Currently content providers are not bound 
by court decisions against direct speakers. See Blockowicz v. Williams, 630 F.3d 563, 569 
(7th Cir. 2010). I believe that in this conversation realm, the result should be different. 
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content from their platforms after receiving a complaint, they 
would be exempt from liability. 
A notice-and-takedown regime is superior to negligence-based 
regime. Applying negligence-based regime in this context is possi-
ble, but at a cost. Under negligence, content providers might be 
held liable even if they did not receive notice regarding a defamato-
ry statement; instead, they might be held liable if they have failed 
to anticipate and prevent the damage. A negligence-based regime 
results in a legal ambiguity regarding the required liability standard. 
It might be difficult for content providers to anticipate a court’s 
interpretation of the tort―through negligence, casual connection, 
and policy considerations―and as a result, they would be unable to 
predict the scope of their liability. This legal ambiguity would lead 
to a defensive strategy that may limit free speech disproportionally. 
Therefore, a notice-and-takedown regime is superior and sets bet-
ter balances between free speech and dignity. The conclusions out-
lined by the model regarding both categories of victims are in-line 
with the reviewed normative consideration.312 
Table II below summarizes the model and the liability regimes 
for regulating content providers. 
                                                                                                                            
312 Exempting the liability of content providers from the damage caused to internal 
victims and applying a notice-and-takedown regime for external victims sets the optimal 
balance between constitutional rights and speech torts. Social norms and the ability of the 
internal user to counter speech mitigates the damage; therefore, in this setting, exempting 
content providers from liability is desirable and prevents a disproportional chilling effect. 
The external victim’s damage is exacerbated by social dynamics. Therefore, a different 
balance should be found for this setting. A notice-and-takedown regime is a proper 
balance. Corrective justice justifications also support this conclusion, since the content 
provider did not cause the damage to the victim; the operation of the platform is only a 
background risk. It might appear as if a notice-and-takedown regime does not fit well with 
corrective justice justifications. Yet, this liability regime outlines a conditioned 
exemption. Therefore, this regime is not contradictory to corrective justice justifications. 
These rules are also efficient economically. The costs of prevention of the proposed rule 
to internal victims are relatively low in relation to the damage. However, the severity of 
damage to the external user may be extensive. Therefore, from the perspective of cost-
benefit analysis, deterrence might be more efficient. Exempting content providers would 
reduce liability risks and incentivize innovation. It might appear as if a notice-and-
takedown regime would stifle innovation and might even deter entrepreneurs from 
developing platforms, but this is doubtful. Proportional liability would not impede the 
development of these platforms as long as profits can be generated from such settings. 
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Table II: Summary of the Model 
The 
Conver-
sation 
Platform 
The 
Strength 
of Ties 
Severity of Harm Private Ordering 
Content Provid-
ers’ Liability 
Internal 
Victim 
External 
Victim 
Internal  
Victim 
External 
Victim 
Internal 
Victim 
Exter-
nal 
Victim 
Freestyle 
Conver-
sation 
Weak 
ties, at 
most 
)-(  )-(  (+) (+) )-(  )-(  
Marginal harms, 
Stand-alone ex-
pressions 
Heterogeneous 
one-time 
Participants, 
Low credibility, 
Immediate& 
spontaneous, 
Mostly anonym-
ous, 
Only few readers  
Marginal harms, 
Stand-alone ex-
pressions 
Heterogeneous 
one-time partic-
ipants, low cre-
dibility, imme-
diate & sponta-
neous, mostly 
anonymous, on-
ly few readers. 
Market 
forces 
Variety 
of opi-
nions, 
counter-
ing 
speech 
with 
more 
speech 
Market 
forces 
Variety of 
opinions, 
countering 
speech with 
more 
speech 
Exemp-
tion 
from 
liability 
Ex-
emp-
tion 
from 
liabili-
ty 
Peer 
Produc-
tion 
Mostly 
weak 
ties; 
Inter-
mediary 
ties 
among 
core 
partici-
pants 
form 
“small 
worlds” 
(+) (+) (+) (+) )-(  )-(  
Intermediary 
gravity of harm; 
detailed in-depth 
information; he-
terogeneous par-
ticipants; mostly 
one time players; 
credible informa-
tion; on the other 
hand, conversa-
tion is not fo-
cused on personal 
information and 
most participants 
do not use their 
real identity thus 
harm is limited. 
Extensive gravi-
ty of harm; the 
platform aggre-
gates informa-
tion to a com-
plex product; 
heterogonous 
participants; 
mostly one time 
players; credible 
information; the 
defaming state-
ments are di-
rected towards 
the victim’s real 
identity. 
Hetero-
geneous 
balanced 
conversa-
tion 
Formal 
or infor-
mal dis-
pute res-
olution 
mechan-
isms 
Reci-
procal 
social 
control 
Hetero-
geneity 
and 
Diversity 
brings to a 
balanced 
outcome 
Correction 
by other 
participants 
Feedback 
and Repu-
tation me-
chanisms 
Exemp-
tion 
From 
liability 
Ex-
emp-
tion 
From 
liabili-
ty 
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The 
Conver-
sation 
Platform 
The 
Strength 
of Ties 
Severity of Harm Private Ordering Content Provid-
ers’ Liability 
Internal 
Victim 
External 
Victim 
Internal  
Victim 
External 
Victim 
Internal 
Victim 
Exter-
nal 
Victim 
Delibera-
tion and 
Structur-
ing Com-
munities 
Poten-
tial for 
strong 
ties 
(+) (+) (+) )-(  )-(  (+) 
Extensive gravity 
of harm. 
In-depth infor-
mation, 
Homogeneity 
Repeat players, 
Credibility. 
Emotional harm. 
However, the 
harm for partici-
pants who choose 
not to reflect 
their real identity 
would be limited. 
Extensive gravi-
ty of harm. 
In-depth 
Information, 
Homogeneity 
Repeat players, 
Credibility. 
Mass attacks 
against specific 
victims, 
Informational 
and reputational 
cascades. 
Private 
ordering 
by social 
norms 
within 
the 
commu-
nity 
Aware-
ness of 
victims 
to social 
norms 
and self-
risk man-
agement  
Strong ties 
result in 
social pres-
sure and 
informa-
tional and 
reputation-
al cascades 
that ex-
acerbate 
harm 
Failure of 
private or-
dering 
Exemp-
tion 
From 
liability 
No-
tice 
and 
Take-
down 
re-
gime  
E. The Proposed Model and Law: Bridging the Gaps 
The proposed model outlines context-specific liability regimes 
for content providers. These liability regimes take into account the 
severity of harm, the potential for countering social forces, private 
ordering, and the victim’s setting (internal or external) in every 
conversation platform. It offers an optimal balance between free 
speech and reputation. This model refrains from utilizing a negli-
gence liability regime and promotes a free market of ideas. Yet, the 
model attempts to mitigate a victim’s harm whenever severity is 
extensive and private ordering is lacking. 
The current law provides an extensive shield for content pro-
viders’ immunity to civil liability for speech torts. Therefore, 
courts neither account for context-specific considerations nor dis-
tinguish between conversation platforms. This overall immunity 
scheme was constructed when the web was in its infancy. As the 
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web matures, this regime must be reconsidered and refined. An 
overall analysis points at deliberation and community platforms as 
a crucial juncture where change in the current legal infrastructure 
is needed.313 Such a change will likely call for amending the rele-
vant law, such as § 230 of the CDA. This would be done by adding 
an exception to the immunity by outlining a notice-and-takedown 
regime for external victims harmed by speech in conversation plat-
forms aimed for deliberations and communities. In these online set-
tings, courts would have the discretion to deny motions to dismiss, 
allowing lawsuits to proceed from the preliminary stages if the con-
tent provider did not remove the defamatory speech after receiving 
proper notice. 
Enabling court discretion in regards to external victims would 
allow a legal flexibility to an ever-changing setting. This proposal 
offers content providers the benefit of relative certainty without 
undermining the value of immunity. It would also enable courts to 
adjust to changing social contexts, resulting in fair and just out-
comes. This model will not cause a legal revolution because today 
secondary liability lawsuits against content providers advance 
beyond the preliminary stages.314 For example, there are plaintiffs 
that bypass § 230 of the CDA by raising direct and contributory 
claims that exceed a trivial secondary liability framework.315 In 
                                                                                                                            
313 This change is needed given the high risk of potential damage and the low chance for 
countering social forces and private ordering. 
314 Today, more than a third of the claims already survive a § 230 defense. See Ardia 
supra note 62, at 493. 
315 For instance, plaintiffs here might bring contractual claims, failure-to-warn claims, 
and even fraud claims. See Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., 767 F.3d 894, 895 (9th 
Cir. 2014), reh’g granted, opinion withdrawn, 778 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2015) (basing their 
claim on negligence theory); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) (basing 
her claim on a contractual claim); Moore v. Angie’s List, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 3d 802, 807 
(E.D. Pa. 2015) (basing their claim on fraud). In addition, I would like to note that some 
lawsuits regarding content providers’ liability for speech-related torts are not barred on 
preliminary stages in light of courts’ interpretation of the terms “creation” and 
“development of information” in § 230 of the CDA. Thus, content providers are already 
exposed to liability risks when plaintiffs file claims based on direct or contributory liability 
theories. These claims exceed this discussion, since I focus on secondary liability. 
Immunity is, therefore, very broad, but not hermetic. See Fair Housing Council v. 
Roommates.com, LLC., 489 F.3d 921, 932 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc, 521 F.3d 1157 
(9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the content provider developed content by designing 
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some of these cases, the value of immunity is undermined. In stark 
contrast, the model I propose here outlines specific guidelines that 
do not cause liability ambiguity, yet they are not revolutionary. 
From a normative perspective, the proposed framework brings to 
an optimal balance between constitutional rights, leads to more just 
results, and promotes efficiency and innovation. 
F. Addressing Criticism and Objections to the Proposed Model 
The model exempts content providers from secondary liability 
to speech-related torts in freestyle and peer-production conversa-
tion platforms. It also exempts content providers from the liability 
for the damages caused to the internal victim in deliberation and 
community platforms. External victims, however, will be protected 
by a notice-and-takedown regime. After drawing out this context-
specific framework for content providers’ liability, the following 
Sections will acknowledge several objections to the model and will 
address challenges arising from the proposed model and respond 
them. 
First, a possible outcome of the notice-and-takedown liability 
regime is that entrepreneurs would focus their investments in 
freestyle and peer-production ventures. In order to minimize liabil-
ity risks, they might refrain from investing in deliberation and 
community platforms, which is an undesirable outcome. 
This possibility, however, is not realistic because of the busi-
ness model of such websites. Most content providers are guided by 
economic considerations and profits garnered by advertisements on 
their sites.316 These conversation platforms are magnets of online 
                                                                                                                            
discriminatory drop-down menus); see generally Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, 
LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d 818 (E.D. Ky. 2013), rev’d and vacated, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(demonstrating that even though the content provider was ultimately exempt from 
liability, the litigation was extensive and passed through number of courts). 
316 Content providers compete for viewers’ eyeballs and aim to profit from commercial 
advertisements on their platform. Today, technology enables advertisers to know how 
many eyeballs viewed the advertisements. It can also customize content. Content 
providers can display advertisements related to the content on their websites. They can 
also target advertisements to particular Internet users. These advertisements may be 
generated based on the user’s history, his preferences, his location, and the composition 
of his social network. Content providers gain more profit from advertisements as users 
pay attention to them and engage with click-through advertising. The success of online 
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participation. Participants of these platforms are homogenous and 
tend to be repeat players that are interested in certain subjects. 
These characteristics allow targeting advertisements efficiently. 
Advertisers can utilize these characteristics including the pow-
er of social influence and context in advancing their aims. There-
fore, they would pay higher prices for advertising in these plat-
forms. In order to attract more users and garner more profits, cost-
benefit analysis would bring content providers to invest resources 
in dealing with complaints and removing defamatory content, or 
else they would expose themselves to liability. They will not refrain 
from investing in these platforms.317 This analysis does not apply to 
non-commercial content providers, but non-profit sites are normal-
ly driven by ideology and would not forgo their investment just be-
cause of this exposure, since the liability is limited. Thus, non-
commercial content providers should not lose their incentive to 
invest in their platform, nor should the regime cause a chilling ef-
fect to their innovation. 
The second objection might be raised in a jurisdiction governed 
by different laws.318 One might argue that exempting content pro-
viders from liability in freestyle and peer-production conversation 
platforms is undesirable. This regime might disincentivize volunta-
ry regulation by content providers. It would allow users to dissemi-
nate defamatory speech irresponsibly without interference.319 
I believe that such concerns are excessive. In many cases, the 
motive for voluntary regulation by content providers is economic 
                                                                                                                            
advertising depends on the degree of customer acceptance and corresponding click-
through rate. See JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU: HOW THE NEW ADVERTISING 
INDUSTRY IS DEFINING YOUR IDENTITY AND YOUR WORTH 102 (2012); Yung-Ming Li et 
al., Enhancing Targeted Advertising with Social Context Endorsement, 19 INT’L J. 
ELECTRONIC COMM. 99, 99–128 (2014); see generally NICHOLAS CARR, THE BIG SWITCH: 
REWIRING THE WORLD, FROM EDISON TO GOOGLE 57–154 (2009). 
317 A comparative overview proves that Facebook flourishes even in legal systems that 
do not provide immunity to content providers, such as in Germany and Israel. See Zarsky, 
supra note 236. 
318 In Europe and Canada, other regimes regulate content providers’ liability. These 
regimes apply to all conversation platforms and are not tailored to a specific context. See 
supra Section I.C. 
319 See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 2, at 193–99 (criticizing the 
immunity regime in general); Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 119. 
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and not driven by legal considerations. In other words, they volun-
tarily regulate defamatory content as part of their business model. 
They are motivated by concern about the potential business, moral, 
and instrumental costs of digital offensive speech, and they see this 
speech as a potential threat to profit. Other content providers are 
motivated to address offensive speech based on their sense of cor-
porate social responsibility.320 
Indeed, in certain cases the incentives for voluntary ordering 
would be lost in light of the exemption from liability outlined by the 
model. However, despite possible negative effects of exemption in 
freestyle and peer-production conversation platforms, this regime 
still offers the optimal balance from all other policy possibilities. 
Due to the low severity of harm in these conversation platforms, 
the outcome of voluntary regulation is the best alternative. 
The third objection is directed specifically against the exemp-
tion from liability in peer-production conversation platforms. The 
severity of harm in this conversation platform is extensive.321 How-
ever, countering social forces mitigate the harm and cause an effi-
cient private-ordering scheme. One might argue that the severity of 
harm remains extensive despite private ordering. This argument 
rests on the “negativity bias” and the greater power of bad events, 
information, or feedbacks over good ones.322 Balancing social forces 
might not hold defamation at bay because negative expressions 
have more gravitas than positive ones. Thus, even if negative 
speech can be countered by positive speech, the correction would 
not be effective. As a result, negative hearsay would outweigh the 
counter-positive expressions, and the defamatory remarks would 
continue to spreads rapidly and harm a person’s reputation. 
This argument is valid; but, as I shall explain below, it does not 
undermine the argument for exemption, since it is the best alterna-
                                                                                                                            
320 See Citron & Norton, supra note 309, at 1453–57 (2011) (describing content 
providers that see aggressive approaches to offensive speech as essential to securing 
online advertising); see also LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, INFORMATION AND EXCLUSION 
128 (2011). 
321 The platform aggregates the participants donations into a complex and credible 
product directed at specific victims. See supra Section III.D.2. 
322 On this psychological bias, see Roy Baumeister et al., Bad is Stronger Than Good, 5 
REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 323, 323–70 (2001). 
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tive compared to the other liability regimes. Countering negative 
speech may indeed mitigate speech-related harm only partially.323 
As a result, readers might still have the wrong impression of vic-
tims and avoid engagement with them, which would undermine 
efficient transactions. Exclusive reliance on private ordering would 
allocate part of the harm to the victim; this outcome is not optimal. 
Yet, alternative regimes would be even more inefficient and unjust. 
Potential liability concerns would lead content providers to remove 
every negative speech from their platform in response to every 
complaint, when applying the notice-and-takedown regime. Alter-
natively, under the negligence regime, content providers might ex-
tensively remove negative speech at their own initiative, including 
true negative statements. This would lead to reliance on partial in-
formation while making decisions. Thus, users might make ineffi-
cient transactions leading to negative experiences that could be 
avoided given full disclosure of the facts. These inefficient en-
gagements would bring individuals to bear all the harm stemming 
from inefficient transactions.324 Everything being equal, allocating 
partial harm to the victim is a better option than removing true 
negative statements from platforms. 
Feedback and reputation mechanisms are embedded in peer-
production platforms. These mechanisms might further mitigate 
speech-related harm.325 Thus, despite the negativity bias, only li-
mited credibility would be ascribed to the defamatory speech when 
the two corrective methods are utilized. I, therefore, conclude that 
exempting content providers from liability in peer-production con-
                                                                                                                            
323 Full correction would materialize only when the correcting speech has more gravitas 
both quantitatively and qualitatively. A lot of positive correcting elements might correct 
negative falsehoods efficiently despite the negativity bias. See David Hoffman & Dawn 
Ash, Building Bridges to Resolve Conflict and Overcome the “Prisoner’s Dilemma”: The Vital 
Role of Professional Relationships in the Collaborative Law Process, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 271, 
294 (2010). 
324 For example, removing negative true reviews about a hotel on a review site would 
mislead Internet users about their future stay. Users would not be privy to the 
information from former guests who did not enjoy their stay. As a result, they would not 
avoid spending their vacation in the hotel. In light of the negativity bias, bad experiences 
caused by inefficient transactions that could be avoided, would be remembered for long 
periods. 
325 On these mechanisms, see supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
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versation platforms is superior to other liability regimes, and it 
promotes the best solution to just and efficient outcomes consider-
ing the alternatives. 
The fourth objection might be directed at the exemption of 
content providers for the damages caused to internal victim. The 
internal victim can control his network personality, use pseu-
donym, or totally refrain from participation and should not be en-
titled to remedies from the content provider. One might argue that 
a liability exemption would result in aggressive conversation 
norms, lack of accountability, and self-exclusion of many partici-
pants from these realms, thus infringing the freedom of speech.326 
Due to the diversity of conversation platforms, the infringe-
ment is not stark. We should bear in mind that self-exclusion from 
conversation platforms may occur outside the Internet. Online, the 
implications of self-exclusion are actually mitigated due to the 
availability of other platforms, making this option tolerable.327 The 
victim can quit participating and find another platform that fits his 
needs. In addition, he can establish a conversation platform himself 
and enforce his preferred deliberation culture.328 
Indeed, some communities have no substitute, such as learning 
communities or online workplace communities. As a result, opting 
out from these platforms might prevent users from receiving im-
                                                                                                                            
326 Exempting content providers from liability might cause frequent self-exclusion of 
actual and potential participants. Witnessing aggressive conversation norms, individuals 
would opt out or refrain from opting in a discussion platform. If content providers would 
not provide them with a relief, few users would remain on the platform. See CITRON, 
HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 2, at 195; Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 
2, at 132 (referring to defamation and harassment online directed at disadvantaged groups 
in society and leading to self-exclusion, which undermines the victim’s right to free 
speech). 
327 The wealth of conversation platforms mitigates the problem of self-exclusion. 
Online, everyone can find the optimal conversation platform for himself. Internal 
defamation victims can exit the offensive conversation platform and move to another. 
The lock-in effect and the difficulty to exchange conversation platform is mitigated 
online. On the lock in effect, see Ruben Rodrigues, Privacy on Social Networks: Norms, 
Markets, and Natural Monopoly, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND 
REPUTATION, supra note 2, at 237, 246. 
328 Any speaker can establish a personal blog on a commercial website or an 
independent platform optimal for his needs. 
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portant professional updates. These special communities might 
justify specific exceptions to the model and a more flexible analysis. 
However, these special communities are mere exceptions to the 
general rule outlined. 
The model assumes that individuals can anticipate the risks of 
participation in advance. It also assumes they can opt out from 
conversations and exit the social community. However, one may 
argue that participants’ autonomy is not absolute due to peer pres-
sure.329 In response to this argument, I claim that the right to au-
tonomy is varied by degrees and depends on context.330 Thus, the 
right to autonomy is not absolute. 
Perhaps special considerations should be made for minors. 
Adults certainly find it difficult to evaluate future risks when par-
ticipating in a specific conversation platform; yet they can opt out 
of a conversation and minimize their harm. Adults are assumed to 
have the autonomy to a degree that would allow them to make the 
right decisions for themselves. Exiting online communities is easier 
than quitting conversations offline because on the Internet partici-
pants have many alternative conversation platforms. 
Minors, unlike adults, are less rational and tend to be more in-
fluenced by social pressures. Hence, the social dynamics might af-
fect them differently, and they might stay in a destructive commu-
nity despite being defamed. Therefore, in this context, it might be 
advisable to impose additional duties on content providers by spe-
cific regulation pertaining to age.331 However, this suggestion is 
complementary to the model and does not undermine it. 
                                                                                                                            
329 Individuals are subjected to cognitive biases. Thus, at the time of the decision to 
participate, they might be over-optimistic and not evaluate social pressures and other 
anticipated risks. See SUNSTEIN, RUMORS, supra note 235, at 21–30. Extensive research 
addressed the limits of autonomy. Accordingly, individuals materialize their autonomy 
only if society enables them. Therefore, individuals should be protected from external 
influences in order to enable them to materialize their autonomy. See ISAIAH BERLIN, 
TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY: AN INAUGURAL LECTURE DELIVERED BEFORE THE 
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD ON 31 OCTOBER 1958 (1959). 
330 See JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE AND THE 
PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 16–21 (2012). 
331 The law already protects minors online by specific regulation in the context of 
privacy. See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 
(2006). Additional regulation might be needed in order to protect minors from 
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The fifth objection to the model concerns search engines. One 
might argue that in light of the option to find information using 
search engines, distinctions between conversation platforms is 
meaningless. The search results reflect specific expressions and get 
them out of the conversation platform’s context. Search engines 
blur the line between internal and external settings. Thus, exposure 
to a statement regarding the internal victim via search engines does 
not enable the users to witness private-ordering dynamics. 
Indeed search engines show specific statements independently, 
detached from their original conversation platform and group con-
text. However, this does not change the suggested taxonomy. 
Search engines get expressions out of context only on the first layer 
of search results (this layer includes short quotations in the results 
page). However, when an individual has an interest in a specific 
search result, he would not be satisfied with the partial quotation 
and would follow the link, which would expose him to the private-
ordering dynamics of the group. Hence, search engines do not un-
dermine the distinctions between conversation platforms and 
group contexts as far as content providers’ liability is concerned.332 
CONCLUSION AND THE PATH FORWARD 
Technologies enable vast opportunities to carry out speech-
related torts. Content providers are highly visible “choke points” 
for online speech. Therefore, the legal discussion turns to their lia-
bility and the ability to collect damages from these deep-pocketed, 
                                                                                                                            
defamatory statements. Terms of Service in popular social networks do not allow minors 
under thirteen years old to participate. Therefore, a partial solution to the problem is 
enforcing the Terms of Service and imposing content providers to verify participants’ 
ages. Cf. How Old Do You Have To Be To Sign Up for Facebook?, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/210644045634222 [https://perma.cc/J9D8-LDPV] 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2016) (requiring users to be at least thirteen years old). 
332 This conclusion does not stand in line with the ruling in the European Union 
regarding the “right to be forgotten.” See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos, A.N., 2014 E.C.R. 317, at para. 91. However, I believe 
this ruling is too extensive. In the United States, there is no general “right to be 
forgotten.” See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745-746 (9th Cir. 2015); Google, Inc. 
v. Expunction Order, 441 S.W.3d 644, 647 (Tex. App. 2014).  
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ever-present entities that facilitate the harmful exchange. This Ar-
ticle aspired to take initial steps to address content providers’ lia-
bility for speech torts. I laid theoretical and practical outlines to a 
new innovative model for regulating content providers’ liability. 
This model is based on a sociological approach and emphasizes the 
importance of the conversation platforms’ contexts, rather than the 
content of the expressions themselves. Coming from this approach, 
I focused on the strength of ties between participants, their social 
dynamics, and interactions, rather than on the content of the 
speech. 
Basing this study on network theory studies, I classified online 
conversation to three main categories, creating an innovative tax-
onomy knotted to social structures. I translated this taxonomy to 
legal terms. This framework distinguishes between conversation 
platforms and group contexts. It shows that in some contexts, pri-
vate ordering mitigates harm efficiently, whereas in others, it is in-
sufficient. As a result, some formal legal intervention is needed. 
This model aims to structure judicial discretion and assist courts to 
accommodate just and efficient policy in determining content pro-
viders’ liability for speech torts. The model is not abstract and re-
frains from relying on open-ended standards, such as severity of 
harm, private ordering, and the victim’s setting. Rather, it outlines 
modular rules that serve as a proxy to these standards. 
This model might appear less accurate in comparison to an 
open-ended based model that enables broad judicial discretion or 
reference to a specific circumstance, such as the characteristics of a 
specific platform. The model’s benefits are certainty and clarity. It 
allows courts to apply simple rules of thumb, avoiding cumbersome 
litigation since it determines the scope of liability based on social 
dynamics and contexts. These rules of thumb would contribute and 
improve judicial processes and direct courts to systematic and con-
sistent decisions. This would also enable content providers, who 
are often repeat-players in court, efficient risk management. I be-
lieve that this model is superior to the legal regime that exists to-
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day, since it offers just and efficient outcomes, and it promotes the 
social values discussed throughout this Article.333 
This Article is not the last word on this topic. It leaves several 
questions unanswered: Can this taxonomy be applied to unmasking 
anonymous speakers? What is the speakers’ direct liability? Should 
this model regulate the direct liability of speakers? Another chal-
lenge concerns the spread of falsehoods, sharing and diffusing de-
famatory speech among different conversation platforms, and the 
implications on content providers’ liability. What liability regime 
should apply to content providers that get defamatory speech out 
of the original social context, and share and republish it on other 
platforms governed by different liability regimes? And how should 
the law regulate users’ social sharing of falsehoods between differ-
ent conversation platforms?334 These challenges and others should 
be discussed in future studies. 
                                                                                                                            
333 A modular model for determining content providers’ liability reduces concerns of 
inconsistency and different rulings in similar cases. The outcome of applying these rules 
of thumb would enhance fairness, efficiency, and promote innovation. As I explained, 
applying this model would bring the proper balance between human rights and speech 
torts. It would also prevent disproportional reputation harms in an environment that 
espouses free speech. 
334 New innovative technologies facilitate the distribution of content among different 
platform in a click of a button, for example, by using social-based comment systems and 
Application Programming Interface technology. Sharing content between platforms is 
common nowadays. The model in this Article outlines different liability regimes for 
different conversation realms. However, sharing content among different conversation 
realms get them out of their original social context. 
